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COMMENT
Decrypting the Code of Ethics: The Relationship between
an Attorney’s Ethical Duties and Network Security*
I. Introduction
Imagine that you represent a client in a major legal transaction with a
substantial amount of confidential information. You have file cabinets to
house and organize hard copies of files, and electronic files containing
confidential client information. As a prudent professional, you have taken
extensive steps to secure the physical infrastructure of your office—you have
installed an intruder alarm security system, you have functional door locks and
heavy-duty doors, you have security cameras, and you carefully screen
employees. In fact, it would be reasonable to say that you have met the steps
that would be taken by a reasonably prudent attorney in physically securing
client information. By all outward appearances, your information is secure,
and your ethical and common law duties have been satisfied.
Yet, a security problem still exists that could be the functional equivalent
of an unlocked door, adorned with a plush red carpet and advertised by a neon
flashing sign. Like so many others in your profession, you have a high-speed
Internet connection, and a high-speed network that connects the computers in
the office to each other, allowing office employees to quickly and efficiently
perform such mundane tasks as sharing files and using network printers. And,
unwittingly, like so many other attorneys, by establishing this seemingly
benign connection to the outside world, you have forged a path toward your
own financial destruction.
The first signs of disaster are clear but are unnoticed by you or any of your
staff. Even though a simple procedure would have alerted you that a thirdparty “hacker” is probing your network, you are unaware of the monitoring
and auditing procedures necessary to detect and prevent such activities, let
alone what to do if an intrusion was detected. Thus, as you continue working,
an undetected and unauthorized intruder uses advanced tools to scan your
computers for weaknesses through your Internet connection. As the day
lingers, the hacker has already gained enough information to access your
networks, but will not do so—yet. He would much rather wait until you leave
* This writing is dedicated, with immeasurable love and admiration, to my wife, Lori, and
my daughter, Haven Lee. Absent their unyielding support, patience, and passion, ever-present
throughout my turbulent law school adventure, neither this work nor my graduation would have
been possible.
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for the evening, ensuring that his plans will not be interrupted. Patiently
waiting, he watches eagerly as each employee begins to log off of the network
and as network traffic slows to a crawl. The attack is at hand.
The first targets are the shared files and folders available on the network.
Once a convenience and tool of efficiency for office employees, the files are
now low-hanging fruit for the hacker. He finds interesting information within
the files, including clients’ personal records, case memos, and various tidbits
of information that indicate the firm’s strategies for the litigation at hand. Not
wanting to miss anything, he copies all of these files to his computer.
Unfortunately for you, this is not enough to satisfy the hacker’s appetite.
The hacker knows that while the shared files and folders have important
information, other important targets exist as well. Using credentials that give
him administrative rights on the network, he gains access to additional,
unshared files, gathering a tremendous amount of information. This includes
files that contain the usernames and passwords for every user on the network.
Possessing information that his employer has asked him to provide, the
hacker now takes steps to ensure that his identity cannot be discovered. He
clears the security logs so that a detailed understanding of the order and
method by which he completed his attack will be difficult, if not impossible,
to ascertain. On an impulse, the hacker also installs an array of software
applications that, unknown to you, will log keystrokes, record from the
microphones, and capture images from the webcams installed on office
computers. He also configures a remote connection so that he can easily gain
access to your network in the future.
The results are devastating and not altogether unpredictable. Personal client
information, including social security numbers, is sold to third parties, who use
the data to establish lines of credit and fraudulently obtain money and
merchandise in the client’s name. Worse, information is returned to the
hacker’s employer, perhaps connected to the opposing party, which severely
weakens or destroys the attorney’s case, and costs the client millions of
dollars. The client is furious, feeling betrayed, sickened, and compromised.
The identity of the hacker will never be discovered, and he will never be
brought to justice for his shameful acts. Nevertheless, there is one party upon
whom blame can be placed—you.
Relying upon the rules of legal ethics, your former client claims that you
improperly failed to take reasonable steps to secure your computer network
from attack, thereby facilitating these events. The client relies upon the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, claiming that you failed to competently
perform your duties1 and that you impermissibly revealed client information
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
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to a third party.2 To your horror, the client is victorious; you are responsible
to your former client for millions of dollars in damages.
This article argues that attorneys have a duty to take certain reasonable
measures to secure their computer network. The failure to take such measures
may result in breaching ethical duties owed to clients.
Part II provides an overview of information technology, as applied to the
law office, with an emphasis on networking and hacking techniques that can
result in unintended disclosure of confidential information. Part III explores
the ethical duties owed by attorneys to clients, weighing strong and weak state
models to discover the best computer ethics standards. Part IV analyzes
Oklahoma as a model state for computer ethics. Part V weighs the probability
and gravity of a hacking attack against the burden imposed upon an attorney
to provide network security, concluding that an attorney has a duty to
reasonably secure his electronic files, and offering specific, practical
recommendations that attorneys should use to help fulfill this duty. This paper
concludes with Part VI.
II. Defining Technology & the Electronic Law Office
An attorney must possess a basic understanding of networking to
understand the steps that he or she must take to secure confidential electronic
files. As more technology is incorporated into daily business, an attorney must
be aware of weaknesses caused by the technology that might lead to a breach
of an ethical duty. While an attorney cannot be expected to operate as a
networking professional, it is imperative that attorneys understand at least a
cursory level of computer technology used in the law office and how that
technology may be reasonably secured. Furthermore, to adequately appreciate
the network vulnerabilities of the modern law office, it is helpful, if not
essential, to create an organizational structure by which the computer
technology may be classified. In other words, since the attorney is ethically
bound to take reasonable steps to ensure the nondisclosure of client
information, it would be futile to discuss the steps that should be taken by an
attorney to secure the attorney’s network without first discussing and defining
the technology associated with and commonly used in law office networks.
A. Law Office Technology and Wired Networks
In the modern law firm, computer networks are becoming more prevalent.3
A study published by the ABA Legal Technology Resource Center in 2003
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
3. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2006 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY
REPORT: MOBILE LAWYERS 39-42 (2006).
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showed local area networks and high speed Internet connections were nearly
ubiquitous in medium to large firms.4 In another study, 70% of firms used
local area networks, 27% used wide area networks, 43% used the Internet, and
19% used an Extranet.5 By 2006, 76.6% of attorneys across all firms used
computer networks, an increase of 6.6%.6 95% of large firms use networks,
the highest percentage of technological usage in the industry.7 Further, 99%
of attorneys use the Internet in their offices.8 Since sharing files intra-office
can increase productivity, it is no surprise that networking has become more
common.9
Law office networks often contain routers, switches, remote access devices,
and firewalls.10 Routers are the “traffic cops” of the Internet that connect
networks with other networks.11 For example, when a user enters the name of
a desired website into a browser, the computer’s request is routed across the
Internet, “hopping” from network to network, finally arriving at the
appropriate location. Then, perhaps using an alternate path, information is
routed back to the user. Because of this vital function, routers are the
backbone of the Internet. Likewise, switches connect similar and dissimilar
devices to form local intranets, which are sometimes referred to as local area
networks.12 Switches function like routers, directing traffic. However,
switches are designed to be a lower-cost option to manage a single local
network, as opposed to a network-to-network communication platform.13
Routers and switches also facilitate the use of remote access equipment.
Remote access equipment allows an attorney to connect to files stored on
his or her office network from somewhere else. For example, a law office
might have several modems that allow users to establish dial-up networking
connections to the office.14 Likewise, remote access servers (RASs) allow

4. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2003 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY REPORT:
LAW OFFICE TECHNOLOGY, at xi-xii (2003) (noting that in 2001, 96% of legal organizations
with ten or more attorneys had a local area network, and most of the firms had a high-speed
connection to the Internet).
5. BRENT D. ROPER, USING COMPUTERS IN THE LAW OFFICE 42 (4th ed. 2004).
6. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at 39-42.
7. Id.
8. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2004-2005 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY
REPORT: MOBILE LAWYERS, at xi (2005).
9. See id.
10. See SUSAN YOUNG & DAVE AITEL, THE HACKER’S HANDBOOK—THE STRATEGY
BEHIND BREAKING INTO AND DEFENDING NETWORKS 552-53 (2004).
11. Id. at 552.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 552-53.
14. Id. at 553-54.
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attorneys to “tunnel” through another Internet connection and gain access to
the firm’s network through a virtual private network (VPN).15 Alternatively,
Microsoft Remote Desktop enables an attorney to remotely manage an office
computer, using an efficient virtual environment.16
Attorneys are using remote access more frequently to access electronic
office files.17 According to a 2005 ABA survey, VPN use increased
dramatically between 2002 and 2005, up from 19% to 25%.18 Further, in
2006, VPN usage surged to 28%, with 49% of large firms using the
technology.19 The increased popularity of VPNs to access files remotely
highlights the importance and convenience of remote access to the client files.
Nevertheless, this convenience does not come without a cost.
While remote access can vastly increase productivity and convenience, it
creates an inherent security risk. By allowing an attorney to connect to the
office network from some computer outside the office, a computer in the office
must be actively “listening” for the attorney to solicit a connection. The office
networking equipment must also be configured to allow this type of outside
connection. Because remote access solutions leave an “open door” in the
office network to accept connections from the Internet, they inherently present
security risks. As noted by the ABA, “if client documents can be retrieved
remotely by the lawyer, then perhaps the materials also could be accessed by
people not authorized to view them.”20 A firewall, which limits the type of
connections that can be made from the Internet to a local network, can help
minimize this risk.
Firewalls represent the primary means of protection against Internet
hazards.21
Like Roman Sentinels, a firewall scrupulously monitors
communications that pass through the “door” from the network to the Internet.
Technically, a firewall allows a law firm to “provide access control between
networks and to mediate connection requests based on a preconfigured set of
rules. . . .”22 For example, a firm might configure a firewall to stand between
the high-speed Internet connection and the rest of the network. The firewall
will only allow specific types of information to be passed in and out. A more
complex firewall can be configured to forward all or specific incoming traffic
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 8, at xi.
18. Id.
19. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at xiii.
20. Lawyers Must Use Reasonable Care to Safeguard Electronic Client Files, 22 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 236, 236 (2006).
21. See YOUNG & AITEL, supra note 10, at 104.
22. Id.
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to a specific computer in the law office. Firewalls can be software or hardware
based, and vary greatly in their cost and degree of security offered.23 For
example, some software firewalls are available with zero-cost licensing,24
while other, more complex hardware firewalls require third-party vendor
installations that can exceed $100,000.25 Nevertheless, firewalls are essential
to a secure network.
Nearly all law firms have some type of firewall.26 Between 2004 and 2005,
70% of attorneys used either a hardware or software firewall.27 Solo
practitioners were behind the technological curve, with just over 55% using
this protection.28 However, in 2006, over 90% of firms used either a hardware
or software firewall, with 89.2% of solo practitioners meeting this criteria.29
These encouraging statistics may indicate increased awareness by the legal
community of the need for network security.
Finally, an often overlooked but important subset of law office technology
includes e-mail and metadata. E-mail has exploded upon the legal culture. In
a 2005 ABA study, 84.3% of respondents indicated that they used e-mail for
work-related activities at least once a day, while over 96% sent a work-related
e-mail at least each month.30 Of the attorneys that have used e-mail, 96.7% use
the technology for “routine correspondence,” which includes case status
updates, client bills, court filings, and marketing material.31 Further, a higher
percentage of attorneys who use e-mail are sending attachments, up from 89%
in 200532 to 96.6% in 2006.33
As the studies indicate, e-mail is an efficient means of electronic
communication designed to transmit small, mostly text-based messages.34 Email can be used to send text, pictures, and small files intra-office or to other
users on the Internet. While not absolutely secure, e-mail can be configured
23. See id. at 107-08.
24. See Jim Calloway, Who Is Reading Your Hard Drive Tonight?: Security with High
Speed Internet Access and a Few Words About Passwords, 71 OKLA. B.J. 1712, 1714 (2000).
25. Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, ARK. LAW., Spring 2004, at 24, 31.
26. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2006 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY
REPORT: LAW OFFICE TECHNOLOGY 34 (2006).
27. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2004-2005 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY
REPORT: LAW OFFICE TECHNOLOGY 50 (2005).
28. Id.
29. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 26, at 34.
30. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2004-2005 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY
REPORT: WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 51 (2005).
31. Id. at 52.
32. Id. at 53.
33. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2006 ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY REPORT:
WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 49 (2006).
34. See id.
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with additional security measures, such as encryption, that makes an
unintended third-party recipient less likely to be able to read the contents of
the communication.
Metadata is hidden information that, unknown to the sending party, can
sometimes be “mined” and used by the receiving party to learn things about
the document or sender. Metadata can include somewhat innocuous
information, such as the date and time that the file was created, the name and
title of the author, and other information about the software license holder.
However, metadata can sometimes be used to divulge revision history from
some word processing documents, potentially revealing otherwise confidential
information about the sending party. While metadata can easily be “cleaned”
from a document using a free software tool released by Microsoft,35 an
attorney who sends a document containing metadata runs the risk of breaching
client confidentiality.
B. Wireless Networks: Leaving the Front, Back, and Side Doors Open
While attorneys have used traditional wired networks for some time,
wireless networks continue to be an emerging trend, especially in smaller law
offices.36 According to a 2005 ABA study, 23% of firms use wireless
networks to either access the Internet or share files.37 Surprisingly, while the
study indicated only 2.2% of firms with over 100 attorneys used wireless
networking to access the Internet, 11.1% of small firms took advantage of the
technology.38 While the overall percentage of firms using wireless technology
decreased in 2006 to 17%, usage in small and medium sized firms surged.39
According to this newer study, 41% of firms with between fifty and ninetynine attorneys use wireless networks, while 37.9 percent of solo practitioners
have employed wireless connections.40 Wireless networks, however, are
inherently less secure than traditional wired networks, and an attorney who
seeks to use wireless networking should do so with caution.
Wireless networks present a new element to the network security equation:
a lack of physical access is no longer a barrier to network entry. On a wired
network, in order for attackers to gain access to an electronic file, they must
either be directly connected to the physical structure of the internal network
35. The metadata removal tool can be found by searching Microsoft’s website. See
Microsoft Corporation, http://www.microsoft.com (search for “rhdtool.exe”) (last visited Jan.
5, 2008).
36. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 8, at 46.
37. See id. at xiii.
38. Id. at 46.
39. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 3, at xi.
40. Id.
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or gain access to the internal network by “tunneling” through the network’s
Internet connection. In other words, in a traditional law office network, the
attacker must either have actual, physical access to the network wires and
terminals inside the law office, or must gain access to the firm’s files through
the Internet connection. Conversely, in order for a person to connect to a
wireless network, all that is generally required are the appropriate credentials,
such as an encryption key, and a wireless signal.41 This process is commonly
referred to as “associating with” an access point. If hackers can associate with
an attorney’s access point, they can use that point as a staging ground for
further attacks on the attorney’s network, or try to access client files.
Wireless networking security concerns require an attorney who uses
wireless networking equipment to take additional security precautions to avoid
breaching ethical duties. For example, client information and attorney
passwords could be compromised by a hacker with little technical expertise
using a tool that performs “packet sniffing,” in which hackers intercept and
decode radio signals to facilitate access to the attorney’s network.42 Attorneys
using “wireless clients,”43 such as a laptop or PDA equipped with a wireless
card,44 must also be wary of “honeypots” and rouge access points which
41. Some administrators employ additional security, such as Media Access Control
(“MAC”) address filtering. MAC addresses are “a unique address assigned to a networking
device upon its creation by the manufacturer.” YOUNG & AITEL, supra note 10, at 581-82.
However, a simple scan of the wireless network and the clients associated with it provide a
hacker more than enough information to clone a MAC address and bypass this restriction.
Tools to scan wireless networks are widely available and easy to use. See generally id.
42. In a lab test performed by this author, an access point was configured with a MAC
address and an eight-character WEP password. (For an explanation of WEP, see infra note 358
and accompanying text.) By monitoring the wireless traffic with one network card and probing
the access point with another network card, thereby simulating client communication on the
network, enough data packets were captured to discover the wireless password in under ten
minutes. Note that the speed at which this attack can be successful depends somewhat upon the
amount of network traffic present. Networks configured to use newer WPA security are more
difficult to circumvent than WEP networks, but vulnerabilities still exist. See infra note 359 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, newly developed variants of WPA have proven to be more
secure and seem to be promising, especially when paired with RADIUS authentication. See
YOUNG & AITEL, supra note 10, at 143-46.
43. The term “client” in this context differs from an “attorney’s client.” Generally
speaking, when a device is associated with a network controller, such as a wireless access point,
an authentication server, or a DHCP server, the device is considered a “client” of the network
controller. See id.
44. Wireless security problems are not exclusively limited to laptop computers on wireless
networks. Because the prevalence of personal administrative devices, such as PDAs, supporting
wireless communication is increasing, the vulnerability of information contained on and
transmitted through these devices must be examined. See DAVID MELNICK ET AL., PDA
SECURITY 251 (2003); see also John Cox, Uncertainty Reigns in a Wireless World, NETWORK

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss3/3

2007]

COMMENT

555

attempt to lure the attorney into making a connection to a spoofed access point,
thereby compromising the attorney’s security.45 Several other methods of
attack also exist that allow an attacker to intercept confidential
communications.46
Wireless network attacks are prevalent and expensive, and even networking
professionals can fall victim to hackers. Whether from failure to incorporate
adequate encryption, filtering, physical security, or otherwise, errors in the
configuration of wireless networks have opened doors for attack. For
example, “[i]n a 2005 FBI survey, 93% of respondents stated their enterprises
had detected security breaches within the last twelve months. . . . [T]he
average cost of each breach was approximately $78,000. . . . [Thus, security
is] a practical necessity that has become a reality for today’s wireless
networks.”47 With such volume of wireless network attacks, determining what
the appropriate level of security is for any given wireless network is an
essential knowledge for attorneys who use wireless networks. It is then
incumbent on attorneys to implement the necessary security protocols.
Complicating the problem is the reality that, while wireless networks have
increased in popularity, many parties fail to secure their wireless networks
altogether.48 “Of 88,122 [wireless access points] scanned in 2003, 67% had
not enabled security measures. A more recent survey estimates that some 80%
of U.S. residential wireless networks will be classified as ‘unsecured’ by
2007.”49 Therefore, the attorney should ensure that the expected benefits of
configuring and maintaining a wireless network are adequate to undertake the
risk.
Thus, attorneys are faced with a myriad of considerations with respect to
which networking hardware should be used, as well as which security should
be employed. The security risks associated with a wireless connection must
be weighed against the advantages of wireless connections, such as increased
productivity and mobility. The chief ethical harm is the danger that
confidential client files could be compromised. Because the gravity of this
harm is substantial, and the benefits are minimal, attorneys should carefully

WORLD, Apr. 18, 2005, at 20 (describing how wireless security issues are becoming more
prevalent due to sensitive information being stored on “unsecure[d] smart phones, PDAs,
laptops and MP3 players”).
45. See YOUNG & AITEL, supra note 10, at 174.
46. Id. at 585-89.
47. JOHN R. VACCA, GUIDE TO WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY 164 (2006).
48. See Robert V. Hale II, Wi-Fi Liability: Potential Legal Risks in Accessing and
Operating Wireless Internet, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 543, 547 (2005).
49. Id. (footnote omitted).
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consider whether wireless networks in the law office are a reasonable, prudent
choice.
C. David v. Goliath: The Sophistication and Means by Which an Attorney’s
Computer Network May be Compromised
Attorneys are at an automatic numerical disadvantage in terms of network
security. While there may be one person in the law firm responsible for
ensuring network security, thousands of hackers on the Internet await an
opportunity to gain access to the firm’s computers. As a result, network
security must be agile, versatile, and vigilant. In order to prevent all security
compromises, the network administrator must block every vulnerability in
every instance. In other words, the defender must be right one-hundred
percent of the time, while the hacker need merely exploit one security flaw to
cause substantial damage.50 This is especially troubling for an attorney, whose
strict ethical duties demand heightened performance.
Law firms, like all businesses, must understand what vulnerabilities exist
in their networks. Specifically, a law firm must understand computer and
network security vulnerabilities, as well as the steps and costs associated with
implementing a more secure system.51 Further, an attorney must understand
the mindset and dangerousness of hackers to fully understand the duty to
secure electronic files. Nevertheless, understanding hackers can be difficult.
1. Meeting the Enemy: Understanding & Classifying Hackers and Their
Diverse Skill-Sets
At the outset, it is helpful to note that “hacker” is not a homogenous term.
People engage in hacking for a wide array of reasons and with a diverse range

50. Security vulnerabilities allow a hacker to more easily compromise the security of a
computer. Nevertheless, perhaps one of the more common (and easy to remedy) security flaws
lies within the physical configuration of a network. Ideally, a network should be designed in
a manner that separates the internal network from the Internet so that traffic from the Internet
is filtered through a central, secure location before entering the internal network. For example,
a router should be connected to the point of high-speed access to the Internet. The router should
be internally configured so that the only systems that are not behind a firewall are those systems
which need to be publicly accessed (such as web and e-mail servers). These publically
accessible systems will need to be added to the DMZ (demilitarized zone), which is not
protected by the firewall, or otherwise made available to specific types of network traffic.
Using this configuration, if hackers breach the security of the web server, they must overcome
additional challenges to access the systems behind the firewall. See T.J. KLEVINSKY ET AL.,
HACK I.T.: SECURITY THROUGH PENETRATION TESTING 39 (2002).
51. CATHERINE PAQUET & WARREN SAXE, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR NETWORK SECURITY
7 (2005).
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of skill sets.52 The hacker of least concern acts primarily out of curiosity,
seeking only to determine what information is vulnerable, generally without
taking overt steps to compromise the data.53 The “clever” hacker attempts to
gain access to protected information because gaining such access presents a
challenge.54 The most important difference between a “curious” hacker and
a “clever” hacker is that the clever hacker, once the network security has been
compromised, seeks to cause as much damage in as little time as possible to
gain notoriety.55 A third type of hacker, the “professional,” is a discrete
mercenary. This type of hacker is dangerous because he possesses the skill
and desire to gain access to a network, acquire critical information, and leave
few footprints.56 Perhaps the most dangerous type of hacker to an attorney, the
professional hacker possesses extraordinary skill, understands technology, and
is often hired by a party to produce a specific result, such as acquiring
confidential information or destroying electronic files.57
Another helpful model of classifying hackers is the “tier” method, which
groups hackers by skill type. First-tier hackers include “programmers who
have the ability to find unique vulnerabilities in existing software and to create
working exploit code.”58 First-tier hackers are certainly the rarest, comprising
what would be the tip of the hacking population pyramid. These hackers
possess an extensive knowledge of networking and programming technologies,
spend a good deal of time honing their skills, and have the capacity to work
with other hackers to exploit security weaknesses.59 Second-tier hackers “have
a technical skill level equivalent to that of system administrators.”60 While
their knowledge is less than first-tier, these hackers still have the capacity to
inflict serious damage and understand networking technologies. They possess
enough skill to launch a successful attack, but rely upon first-tier hackers to
find the weaknesses.61 The most common type of hacker falls within the thirdtier classification.62 These hackers, sometimes called “script kiddies,” possess
the least technical understanding, relying predominantly upon software
compiled by more skilled users.63 Despite their technical inferiority, third-tier
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 15.
PAQUET & SAXE, supra note 51, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 10.
See id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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hackers can be highly annoying, dangerous, and “are not afraid to run untested
scripts against networks without truly understanding what the scripts do and
what the consequences may be. This . . . often leads to disaster, such as the
unintended loss of information.”64 By understanding the types and motives of
hackers, attorneys can begin to take affirmative steps to curtail their efforts.
But, attorneys must also understand the methods that hackers use to steal
confidential data.
2. The Anatomy of a Hacking Attack: How to Lose Your License in
Several Easy Steps
Every attack must begin somewhere. At the outset, a hacker will probably
know little about the architecture of the attorney’s network or the type of
security enabled therein. For this reason, one of the first things that a hacker
will try to do is discover the architecture of the network. Often, this procedure
is initiated with a “whois” query that identifies the “administrative contact,
billing contact, and address of the target network.”65 A whois query also
allows the hacker to gain information about the domain name server (DNS)
structure of target, which can give the hacker hints about the number and type
of computers on the network.66 Since DNS servers contain important
information that is used to route traffic on the Internet, the hacker will attempt
to gain access to the “list” in the DNS server by using a “zone transfer.”67 If
successful, the hacker will have a list of some computer names known to the
DNS server.68 This is helpful because the hacker can sometimes identify the
function of a computer by its name. For example, if the computer is called
“mailserver,” the hacker will easily be able to identify its function as an e-mail
post office. This allows the hacker to attack or ignore it accordingly.69
Likewise, if the server is named “Client_Files,” a hacker will not have to guess
which machine contains confidential information.
After a list of machines is ascertained, the computers are “pinged,” a
process analogous to a person poking another to elicit a response, to see if the

64. Id. at 11-12.
65. Id. at 53. Although the “whois” command is natively available on unix-based
machines, several utilities exist that provide this functionality for Microsoft Windows. See id.
66. Domain name servers (“DNS Servers”) play a role in translating Internet names that
are easy for people to use and remember, e.g., www.google.com, to the IP (number) based
system used by computers on the Internet. See id. at 54.
67. Id. at 55.
68. See generally KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50.
69. Computer names should not indicate the function of the computer. When network
names are consecutive or otherwise easy to guess, a hacker might be able to ascertain the
identity of other network computers after the discovery of only one network computer.
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target computer will answer.70 If a computer responds, it is powered on and
“listening” for communication. Thus, after a successful ping response, the
hacker knows that the responding device is a viable target for an attack.
Traceroute commands, which track each hop or turn that network traffic takes,
can also be used to help decode the target network’s architecture and
determine which computers are present.71
Once the identity of network computers becomes known to the hacker,
attempts can be made to identify the operating system installed on the target
computer. By determining which operating system is installed, a hacker can
get a better idea as to which vulnerabilities may exist, and how to directly
target those vulnerabilities.72 The leading tool used to perform this task is
“Nmap,” which “analyz[es] the response of the target’s TCP stack to the
packets [it] sends out.”73 In other words, the program measures the ways in
which the servers respond to specific requests, guessing from this information
which operating system is installed. This can yield spectacular rewards. If, for
example, a Windows NT based server is present on the network, the hacker
can immediately target a specific point, such as TCP port 139, which may
allow the hacker to connect to the default file sharing system.74 If the hacker
can gain access to this service, he can access the shared files stored on that
computer.75
After the operating system is discovered, the hacker uses the information to
target specific ports or a range of ports. Once the hacker has a rough idea of
the ports that are probably available, he will commence a “port scan” on the
target computer, specifically targeting a range of suspect ports.76 If he finds
70. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 57. Ping attacks can, if excessive, use substantial
resources and slow a network. Id. at 58.
71. For example, if there are different paths to different servers, this might hint at the
existence of firewalls or other network topography.
72. See KLEVINKSY ET AL., supra note 50, at 60.
73. Id.
74. By attempting to guess passwords using brute force techniques, the hacker can gain
administrative level security to entire folders, or even volumes of data. See generally id.; see
also infra note 81 and accompanying text for information regarding brute force attacks.
75. This is a conservative result. In a more damaging scenario, the hacker might connect
via the IPC$ share, steal the Windows password hash files, and use his computer to determine
the administrator’s password. After this password information is determined, the hacker can
use the administrator’s credentials to gain access to the computer much more easily. Also, since
many computer users have a common username and password scheme for many online services,
this security compromise could expose users to collateral attacks via Internet services. This
may include, but is not limited to, snooping in Internet e-mail, purchasing items online, and
managing bank account information. See KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50.
76. Although a port scan can target all ports on a system (1 through 65,535), limiting the
search reduces the time required to perform the scan. See id. at 60-63.
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an open port, he may be able to use it to connect to a service hosted on the
target computer,77 leading him to other helpful information.78 In addition, the
hacker may research the open ports to discover if the port numbers are
associated with specific programs. For example, if port 64,301 is open, it will
be possible to deduce that the computer is running pcAnywhere software,
which configures the computer to “listen” on that port.79 This information is
invaluable because the hacker can then search vulnerability databases for
known security flaws and exploits present in the installed software.80
After potential security holes are identified, the hacker will either attempt
to exploit a known security flaw in an application installed on the server, or
will attempt a “brute force”81 attack to attempt to connect to the server through
an open port and service.82 “Exploits” seek to take advantage of certain hidden
weaknesses in the code of some software, while a brute force attack repeatedly
tries a combination of characters to “guess” the credentials. A brute force
attack is analogous to guessing the number on a combination lock one unit at
a time. The advantage of using software to perform this type of attack is, in
some cases, the computer can process tens of thousands of guesses per second.
This may allow a hacker to crack a weak password. After the security has
been defeated, the hacker may have access to confidential files and
information, may delete or modify software installed on the computer, may
access other computers on the network, or may install software designed to
perform various recognizance or malicious activities.83
77. Ports are a logical means by which computers can communicate with one another. For
example, the HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol), which is used while browsing the Internet,
uses port 80 to send information back and forth. This standard is helpful because network
administrators can allow traffic on port 80 to pass through the firewall and route to the web
server without exposing the web server directly to the Internet. Ranging from 1 to 65,535, open
ports can be exploited to allow access to unintended or unauthorized users. Id. at 60.
78. For example, when the hacker attempts to scan and connect to open port 21 for the FTP
(file transfer protocol) service, the target computer will probably return “banner” data
containing the service name and version number. Id. at 63.
79. Id.
80. Several websites have vulnerability databases, including, but not limited to, “Bugtraq
lists, Packetstorm www.packetstormsecurity.org, and SecurityFocus www.securityfocus.com.”
Id. at 64.
81. A brute force attack uses the power of the computer to generate numerous attacks per
time unit against the host computer, hoping to use raw processing power and probabilities to
find the correct combination of usernames and passwords. See generally id. at 320-25.
82. Id.
83. For example, the hacker might install a keystroke monitoring application which can
capture information typed by the user. See id. at 65-67. Other more subtle methods, such as
social engineering, can also be used to acquire passwords. During social engineering, hackers
prey on the weaknesses and gullibility of people to gain access to passwords and other

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss3/3

2007]

COMMENT

561

While there are many dangers associated with the use of technology,
especially networks that are connected to the Internet, the reality of modern
law practice dictates that attorneys will use computers in the law office. If
attorneys were required to ensure absolutely that networks could not be
compromised by a hacker, they would abandon the technology. Not only
would the practice of law be hindered, but the reduction in efficiency would
damage the relationship between the attorney and client. Because this perfect
standard is not applied in modern law, the attorney must determine what steps
must be taken to avoid running afoul of the duty of electronic file security.
III. Attorneys, Ethics, and Computers . . . Oh My! Analyzing the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct
Discussions of ethics and professional responsibility conjure images of
ambulance chasing, contingency fees, and sex with clients. While the old
“common sense” interpretation and application of the rules of professional
responsibility worked well for many years, the advancement of technology has
muddied the ethical waters which are ill suited to topics such as e-mail,
computers, and the Internet. In fact, even ethical drafters two decades ago
could not have contemplated that computer technology would have developed
and become so prevalent in the law office. Thus, states have been left with the
monumental task of interpreting and applying old ethical regulations regarding
confidentiality and competency to the modern realities of the electronic law
office. Not surprisingly, results have varied. Because each state is free to
adopt its own variation of ethical codes of conduct, no single bright line rule
governs the conduct of attorneys with respect to computers and technology.
Nevertheless, a trend has emerged among state bar associations to issue
advisory ethics opinions that help generally define an attorney’s technological
duties. While some states issue only general guidelines, other states have
explicitly defined the rights and responsibilities of an attorney regarding
specific subsets of technology, such as e-mail, unintentional disclosure,
metadata, and electronic storage of client files. The dominant portions of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct that deal with these issues are Rules 1.1
and 1.6.
A. Attorney Competency & Model Rule 1.1
Under Model Rule 1.1, an attorney has a duty of competency, which
includes possessing a basic understanding modern computer technology.
Model Rule 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent

confidential security information. Id.
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representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”84 Traditionally, this rule required an attorney to possess an
adequate level of skill and knowledge, facilitating adequate representation of
the client. Nevertheless, with the increasing popularity of computer
technology in the law office, the rule has been interpreted by a number of
states as requiring knowledge of computer technology.85
An attorney’s duty to understand technology varies, ranging from a duty to
attend continuing education on technology to an affirmative duty to
unilaterally learn and understand computer technology used in client
representation. On the more lenient scale of computer competency, Florida
law counsels continuing education may be necessary to help attorneys
understand the risks associated with sending e-mail and other electronic
communication.86 New York has promulgated a more stringent standard than
Florida, holding that “[r]easonable care may, in some circumstances, call for
the lawyer to stay abreast of technological advances and the potential risks in
transmission in order to make an appropriate decision with respect to the mode
of transmission.”87 New York and Florida are substantially ahead of the
ethical curve in directly rendering attorneys responsible for competent use of
computer technology. Nevertheless, their narrow guidelines fail to encompass
the wide range of technology that is used daily in the law office.
Arizona has issued a much stronger model for understanding Rule 1.1
compliance. The Arizona State Bar requires an attorney who uses electronic
files to “be competent to evaluate the nature of the potential threat to client
electronic files and to evaluate and deploy appropriate [computer security] to

84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
85. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04
(2005), available at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/pdf/05-04.pdf (“[A]n attorney or law firm
is obligated to take reasonable and competent steps to assure that the client’s electronic
information is not lost or destroyed. In order to do that, an attorney must be competent to
evaluate the nature of the potential threat to client electronic files and to evaluate and deploy
appropriate computer hardware and software to accomplish that end.”); Fla. Bar, Prof’l Ethics
Comm., Op. 06-2 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/ (follow “Search” hyperlink;
then follow “Ethics Opinions” hyperlink; then search for “06-2”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Ethics_Opinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=6871; see
also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), available at http://www.
n ys b a .o rg/AM/Temp late.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=63 1 7
&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
86. Fla. Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 06-2.
87. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n,
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709.
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accomplish that end.”88 Thus, Arizona establishes a two-part test for computer
competency: the attorney must be able to identify potential threats, and be
able to correct any problems that are identified. Furthermore, the duty extends
beyond requiring an attorney to act in accordance with what he or she knows
firsthand, specifically requiring the attorney to consult an expert and to ensure
ethical compliance.89
While some attorneys may criticize what seems to be a burdensome
regulation, Arizona has made a bold and visionary decision to force attorneys
competently into the next era of legal practice. Attorneys in Arizona can no
longer argue that they are technically uneducated, and that they cannot,
therefore, protect client files from hackers. Rather, the risk has been allocated
to the party in the best position to employ network security and protect client
files—the attorney.
In addition, some scholars recommend taking the duty of competency a step
further, claiming it may not be enough for an attorney to merely understand
the risks associated with the technology they currently possess if the
technology is not adequate to meet the competency needs of the client.90
Rather, attorneys should be aware of and deploy new technology as needed.91
Attorneys must determine whether “their clients may be placed at risk simply
because they are not making use of high technology that has become
commonplace in their field. If there is risk in using a computer, there may also
be a risk in not using one.”92 Thus, under this interpretation, attorneys would
need to not only understand the technology and dangers associated with his or
her own network, but also be continuously conscious of improvements in
technology that could be an ethical necessity of modern, competent practice.
Some scholars have indicated that this duty extends even further, requiring
an attorney to adopt technology promptly, adding a temporal element to the
attorney’s duty of competency. One noted commentator, Raymond Nimmer,
suggests that attorneys who are slow to adopt generally recognized benefits
available through the use of computers may run afoul of ethical requirements.93
Thus, under these guidelines, an attorney must understand the dangers
associated with the technology and the means by which the dangers can be
remedied, determine whether additional equipment is or should be required to
competently represent the client’s interests, and act quickly to correct any
88. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04.
89. Id.
90. See JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH
TECHNOLOGY LAW (1991).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 7-1 to -35 (1985).
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problem. Therefore, the need for competency is ongoing, the duty is
substantial, and technology in the law office is rapidly evolving.94
Court tolerance of technological ignorance is also evolving. In 1986, in the
case of People v. Barnes,95 an attorney relied upon past precedent to support
his proposition at trial that the state statute of limitations prevented prosecution
of his client for “bail jumping.”96 In the decision, the court acknowledged that
a paper-based authentication of the authority cited by the attorney would have
seemed normal, noting that “[i]f the three lower court cases discussing the
statute of limitations as it relates to bail jumping were ‘shepardized’, no
appellate court cases would be discovered. Similarly a search of [a local
digest] for a higher court precedent would be fruitless.”97 Nevertheless, by
using an electronic search technique, the attorney would have discovered a
binding decision by a higher court that was dispositive on the issue.98 Notably,
the court found no fault on the part of the attorneys, reasoning that the
omission was “understandable,” because “the commonly used and most
expedient research tools [were] not helpful in this instance” and electronic
research techniques “may be unavailable to many attorneys who do not enjoy
the luxury of computer-assisted research . . . .”99 Today, the presence of the
Internet in modern life is so prevalent that a modern court would probably not
reach the same conclusion. Rather, if an attorney failed to substantiate the
accuracy of a cited authority through electronic means, the attorney would
likely run afoul of his evolving competency requirements under Rule 1.1.
On the other hand, in at least one case, the increased use of technology by
an attorney facing discipline helped him receive a softer penalty after missing
a client’s filing deadline. In a 2001 hearing in Louisiana, an attorney faced
disciplinary action when he missed a filing deadline and rendered his client’s
claim worthless.100 Although he still incurred sanctions, the attorney’s
sanctions were reduced because he made a “timely good faith effort to make
restitution or to rectify the consequences of misconduct,” when he configured
94. See ROPER, supra note 5, at 32.
95. 499 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
96. Id. at 346.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (“For example, if one consults McKinney’s annotations to CPL 30.10 under the
topic ‘bail jumping—continuing nature of offense,’ the case is not listed. Nor is it cited in the
annotations to Penal Law Sec. 215.56, 215.57, or 215.59. Finally, reference to ‘limitations of
prosecution— continuing offenses,’ (Key # 149-150) in Criminal Law, West’s New York Digest,
3d ed., does not reveal the Martinez decision.”).
100. In re James F. Welch, La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd., 99-DB-087 (2001), available at
http://www.ladb.org/NXT/gateway.dll/DB/2001-10-03_99-db-087.htm?fn=document-frame
set.htm$f=templates$3.0.
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a software “tickler” system to remind him of upcoming deadlines.101 By taking
this remedial action and embracing technology, the attorney positioned himself
to operate his law office more efficiently while avoiding enhanced liability.
Computer technology in the law office is a modern reality, and it would be
difficult to successfully argue that an attorney “competently” uses his
computer equipment, in terms of the scope of representing the client, if the
attorney fails to properly secure the office computers.
While
misunderstanding or remaining ignorant of security problems and electronic
resources might have been acceptable two decades ago, modern courts might
fail to sympathize with an attorney whose client’s files were discovered
because of the attorney’s failure to competently secure a computer network.
Additionally, an attorney’s technological duties are not limited to competency;
greater concern for many attorneys could arise from the duty of confidentiality.
B. Confidentiality & Model Rule 1.6
Rule 1.6(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent,” including taking steps that could
reasonably prevent the discovery of such information by a third person.102
Model Rule 1.6(a) applies to all information obtained by the attorney from and
about the client,103 but the duty extends beyond a mere prohibition against
intentional publication of confidential information. Instead, an attorney has
an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to prevent even inadvertent
disclosure.104 Specifically, Model Rule 1.6(a) imposes a duty to “act
competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure [of confidential information]. . . .”105 To satisfy this duty, the attorney “must take reasonable
precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of
unintended recipients.”106
Generally, computer-related issues that arise in the context of Model Rule
1.6 relate to encrypted e-mail, unintended disclosure of confidential
information, metadata hidden within files, and electronic storage of client files.
While a healthy majority of states have issued opinions in the last decade
regarding e-mail, and multiple others regarding metadata, the real wildcard in
this equation is the procedures by which attorneys should electronically store
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (emphasis added).
Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 16.
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client files. If an attorney fails to take reasonable steps to secure his computer
network, it could lead to unauthorized disclosure of confidential files. Thus,
an attorney must enable and configure reasonable network security measures
in order to prevent client information from unauthorized disclosure.
Unfortunately, there is no bright line rule on this issue. Nevertheless, analysis
of how other states have regulated the use of law office technology is still
relevant, as it can be synthesized to form a proposed body of law regarding
law office computer network security.
1. Weaker Security Model States
Some states have taken a permissive view of security and technology,
imposing a weaker standard on attorneys who use computers in the law office.
Nearly every state allows attorneys to communicate using unencrypted e-mail,
and some states have reconsidered older rules to allow attorneys to adapt to
changes in technology. As one example, overruling an earlier ethics opinion,
the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association
decided in 2000 that an attorney’s use of unencrypted e-mail usually does not
violate the duty of confidentiality per the Massachusetts Rules of Professional
Conduct.107 Holding that “[l]egal and technical hurdles to the interception of
Internet e-mail give rise to a reasonable expectation [of privacy],” the
committee reasoned that an attorney must take care to ensure that confidential
information is not accidentally relayed to an incorrect recipient, that third
parties do not have access to the client’s e-mail, and that the client has not
expressly requested encrypted communication.108
Likewise, in a 1998 ethics opinion, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York embraced the Internet as a valid and reasonable tool of legal
professionals, finding that the Internet is not sufficiently “insecure as to
prohibit an attorney from conducting any legal business whatsoever over it.”109
The New York City bar opinion held that communication via unencrypted email is reasonable and permissible,110 and the New York Legislature adopted
that policy, changing a rule of civil procedure to state that privileged
information does not lose its privileged nature merely because it was
107. Mass. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 00-01 (2000), available at http://www.
massbar.org/for-attorneys/publications/ethics-opinions/2000-2007/2000/opinion-no-00-1.aspx.
108. Id.
109. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof’l & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 19982 (1998), available at http://www.nycbar.org/Ethics/eth1998-2.htm.
110. Id. (“[A]lthough some early opinions expressed [the] view that unencrypted e-mail
violated confidentiality rules, the prevalent view, which this Committee adopts, is that
electronic transmission is in most instances an acceptable form of conveying client confidences
even where the lawyer does not obtain specific client consent.”).
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transmitted electronically.111 Noting that the criminalization of e-mail
interception reduces the likelihood of interception,112 New York state uses a
sliding scale for security requirements depending upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding the representation. Nevertheless, the attorney must
still disclose to the client that e-mail is subject to interception by hackers.113
Connecticut’s ethics panel took a pragmatic approach, analyzing whether
e-mail could be used without violating the attorney’s duty to take “every effort
practicable to prevent disclosure” of confidential information.114 Weighing the
benefits of e-mail against the risks of disclosure, the panel determined that “[a]
great deal of technical sophistication and a massive commitment of time and
resources on a governmental scale” would be required to intercept an e-mail.115
Further, the panel held, while it was feasible that e-mail could be intercepted,
the risk was so low that attorneys may ethically communicate with a client via
unencrypted e-mail.116 After examining the risk of interception and burden of
non-use, the opinion concluded that e-mail was a permissible tool, and did not
violate the attorney’s ethical duties.117
Misdirected e-mail or documents containing metadata can also lead to a
breach of confidentiality. By scanning a document for hidden metadata, a
receiving party can sometimes discover information that was inadvertently
imbedded in a word processing document. As discussed in Part II, metadata
can include innocuous data, such as the author of a document, or can include
damaging information such as revision history that can reveal confidential
information, including part or all of the trial strategy.
States in the weaker model differ somewhat regarding the duties of
inadvertent recipients of electronic, otherwise confidential, information.
Generally, the weaker model states place more of a duty upon the recipient of
information disclosed unintentionally, thereby weakening what should be a
duty upon the sending party to ensure that information is not accidentally
disclosed. As one example, in a 1994 Maine ethics opinion, the Professional
Ethics Commission of the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar held that
attorneys must give notice to an opposing party if they received what would
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (Consol. 2006).
112. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998), available at http://
www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=6317&TEMP
LATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
113. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof’l & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 19982.
114. Conn. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 99-52 (1999), reprinted in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REFERENCE GUIDE: CONNECTICUT, at C-313 (2000).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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otherwise be privileged information through inadvertent disclosure, if the
attorney knew or should have known that the document should have been
protected by an evidentiary privilege.118 Nevertheless, this holding was
reconsidered in 2000, in light of the facts in the case of Corey v. Norman,
Hanson & DeTroy,119 in which the Maine Supreme Court held that an attorney
who receives obviously privileged data has an affirmative duty not just to
notify the opposing counsel, but to return the wrongly disclosed evidence.120
Likewise, the Professional Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar held that an
attorney who is the recipient of an inadvertent, confidential disclosure has an
affirmative ethical duty to notify the sending party and inform the party that
the confidential information has been received,121 while New Hampshire has
adopted an ethics revision that requires attorney recipients of inadvertent
disclosure, such as a misdirected e-mail, to “promptly notify the sender” in
order to permit that person to take protective measures.122
A number of states have issued ethics opinions that deal with metadata
directly. For example, the New York Bar Association considered the problem
of metadata as early as 2001, holding that it is unethical for attorneys to use
technology to harvest or attempt to harvest hidden data from documents or
trace the origins of e-mail.123 Likewise, Florida places a duty on the receiving
party of documents and e-mail not to harvest or attempt to harvest metadata
stored in the document on the receiving party.124 Under both of these rules, the
burden is upon the receiving party to refrain from discovering confidential
material.
Weaker model states generally allow confidential client information to be
stored electronically. The states in this group typically allow an attorney to
use third-party vendors to service the computer systems upon which the
confidential information is stored without violating the rules of confidentiality.
Many of these states do not require attorneys to affirmatively secure
118. Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 146 (1994), available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/Ethics%20Opinions/Opinion%20146.htm, overruled by Me.
Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 172 (2000), available at http://www.
mebaroverseers.org/Ethics%20Opinions/Opinion%20172.htm.
119. 742 A.2d 933 (Me. 1999).
120. Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 172.
121. Fla. Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 06-2 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/
(follow “Search” hyperlink; then follow “Ethics Opinions” hyperlink; then search for “06-2”).
122. N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2007).
123. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749 (2001), available at http://
www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=6533&TEMP
LATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
124. Fla. Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 06-1 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/
(follow “Search” hyperlink; then follow “Ethics Opinions” hyperlink; then search for “06-1”).
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unnecessarily available confidential information, such as client files stored on
a computer that need not be connected to the network for the vendor to
perform their duties. Thus, the states in this model partially shift the burden
of security from attorneys to the companies with which they contract.
For example, in Maine, non-attorney personnel, such as internet technology
professionals, may be employed or contracted to establish and maintain an
electronic file storage system without violating client confidentiality.125
Nevertheless, the attorney remains responsible for the personnel and their
compliance with the rules of ethics.126 This regulation imposes no affirmative
duty to prevent these vendors from unnecessarily gaining access to
confidential electronic data or supervise their conduct.
One of the most permissive models for electronic storage of client files is
the Nevada rule. In Nevada, not only may attorneys store client files
electronically with few restrictions on his own computer network, but they
may also store client records in electronic format exclusively on third-party
vendor servers across the Internet.127 This could result in a situation in which
a client is located in Los Angeles and his files are electronically stored in New
York, potentially creating access and security problems.
A better standard for electronic storage of client documents would render
the attorney primarily and proactively responsible for electronic file security.
This might require the attorney to isolate certain files or computers on the
office network if a third-party vendor requires access to a computer system.
By merely stating that an attorney remains responsible for ethical violations
but not requiring him or her to take proactive measures to protect client
confidentiality from third-party contractors, the weak model states attempt to
impose a punitive remedy after the information is disclosed that fails to
proactively further the interest of the client.
2. Stronger Model States
The stronger model states are generally more protective of client
confidentiality, placing an affirmative, contemporaneous duty of security upon
the attorney to preserve confidentiality. Among the leaders in the strong
model states, in a 1997 ethics opinion, the Committee on Rules of Professional
Conduct of the State Bar of Arizona held that an attorney should exercise care
when e-mailing confidential information, and, because of the wide availability
125. Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 185 (2004), available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/Ethics%20Opinions/Opinion%20185.htm.
126. Id.
127. State Bar of Nev., Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 33
(2006), available at http://www.nvbar.org/Ethics/Op%2033%20Electronic%20Data%20storage.
pdf.
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of encryption programs, the attorney “may want to have the e-mail encrypted”
to prevent the “inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.”128 The
opinion also noted that e-mail should not be considered to be a “sealed” form
of transmission, and should include a disclaimer to that effect.129 Likewise,
Pennsylvania requires an attorney who communicates through e-mail to take
reasonable steps to protect client confidentiality,130 but the Committee on
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association notes that, because of the rapid evolution of technology, the
analysis and advice regarding e-mail may change.131
Although the stronger model states are in the minority in terms of e-mail
restriction and requirements, their policy is more technologically sound.
According to a 2006 ABA survey, 48.8% of attorneys use e-mail to send
confidential or privileged information to clients at least once per day.132
Almost 90% of responding attorneys have used e-mail at least twice per year
to transmit confidential information.133 Shockingly, a dismal 16.4% of
attorneys used encryption to protect their communication, while 76% relied
upon a “confidentiality statement accompanying the transmission” to protect
the sensitive data.134 Only 14.5% of attorneys required their clients to consent
to the transmission of their confidential data, and less than 3% required clients
to sign a waiver or release.135 Sixteen percent did not secure the transmission
whatsoever.136 Because of the frequency with which attorneys use e-mail to
transmit confidential information and the ease of configuring enhanced
security, attorneys should be required to encrypt e-mails that contain
confidential information. This additional security protects both the interests
of the client and the attorney, and should be considered even by attorneys in
states that do not require the additional precautions.
Under the stronger model, the recipients of unintentionally disclosed
electronic data may sometimes use it in the course of the case. For example,
in three recent ethics opinions, various bar associations in New York analyzed
128. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04 (1997),
available at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=480.
129. Id.; see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
130. Pa. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Guidance Op. 97-130
(1997), available at 1997 WL 816711.
131. Pa. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2005105 (2005), available at 2005 WL 2291093.
132. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 33, at 51.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 52.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 51.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss3/3

2007]

COMMENT

571

the duties of parties who receive information through e-mail or other electronic
means, likely the result of an inadvertent disclosure. In 2002, an ethics
opinion issued by the New York County Lawyers’ Association stated that an
attorney who receives information believing it was not intended for him or her
has an affirmative duty to refrain from reviewing the document, to contact the
sender, and to comply with the sender’s wishes with respect to returning or
destroying the document.137 Nevertheless, this hard line stance softened
somewhat in December of 2003, when the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York reasoned that, in limited circumstances, an attorney may use
information “gleaned before knowing or having reason to know that the
communication contain[s] [privileged information].”138 That stance was
reaffirmed and elaborated upon by the New York State Bar Association in
2004.139
Washington, D.C., allows good-faith recipients of confidential information
to use the data irrespective of the rules of confidentiality. Under this rule, if
an attorney is the good-faith recipient of inadvertent information, the attorney
need not dispose of the document, and “engages in no ethical violation by
retaining and using those documents.”140 In other words, an attorney who
receives confidential metadata embedded within an otherwise voluntarily
transmitted electronic document is prohibited from reviewing the content of
the metadata “only where he has actual knowledge that the metadata was
inadvertently sent.”141
Likewise, the State Bar of Arizona considered three alternative approaches
for dealing with inadvertent disclosure.142 It rejected a “lenient” approach, in
which inadvertent disclosure is definitively not a waiver of evidentiary
privileges, because an affirmative waiver is required.143 The Bar also rejected

137. N.Y. County Laws. Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 730 (2002), available
at http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications266_0.pdf.
138. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. of Prof’l & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 200304 (2003), available at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2003.html.
139. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. of Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004), available at http://www.
nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm&CONTENTID=6871.
140. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_
lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion256.cfm.
141. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_
lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm.
142. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04 (2005),
available at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/pdf/05-04.pdf.
143. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the lenient standard,
relying upon cases from Florida and Illinois); see also State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules
of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04.
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a “strict” test, in which waiver is expanded “to all other communications
relating to the same subject matter.”144 Instead, the court picked a middle test,
in which five factors are considered to determine whether waiver applies.145
The five factors include the reasonableness of precautions taken, the number
of disclosures, the extent to which files were disclosed, the remedial action
taken by the attorney, and the interests of justice.146
Interestingly, stronger model states allow the receiving party greater latitude
regarding the mining and recovery of metadata. For example, in a 2006 ethics
opinion, the Ethics Committee of the Maryland State Bar Association
unexpectedly rendered a potentially visionary guideline for the use of metadata
and inadvertently disclosed information.147 Under this guideline, Maryland
attorneys may use third-party software to scan electronic files that they possess
as a result of intentional discovery.148 This technique could reveal unintended
information hidden within the layers of the document.149 In addition, the
recipient of either files containing metadata or files that were otherwise
procured as a result of unintentional disclosure need not notify the opposing
counsel and tell him or her that the information has been discovered.150
The stronger model states also require more stringent effort by the attorney
to ensure the security of electronically stored documents. In 2005, the
Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar held that, while
an attorney could ethically use third-party vendors to “support and maintain
a computer software application utilized by the law firm,” the attorney must
take reasonable steps to ensure that the third parties comply with the rules of
confidentiality.151 Likewise, Pennsylvania allows attorneys to use third-party
vendors to service electronic file systems, so long as the attorney takes
reasonable steps to ensure that the vendor will protect client confidentiality.152

144. Bicknell, 86 F.3d at 1483 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir.
1989)).
145. Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); State Bar of Ariz.,
Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04.
146. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04.
147. Md. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 2007-09 (2006), reprinted in Ethics of
Viewing and Using Metadata, MD. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 52.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. (noting that the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may change the way in
which this rule is applied).
151. Mass. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 05-04 (2005), available at http://www.
massbar.org/for-attorneys/publications/ethics-opinions/2000-2007/2005/opinion-05-04.
152. Pa. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2005-105
(2005), available at 2005 WL 2291093.
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New Jersey leads the states in defining the rights and responsibilities
attorneys have with respect to electronic storage. A 2006 New Jersey ethics
opinion states that electronic storage of client files is not only ethical, but
preferable.153 The Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics reasoned that
electronically stored files facilitate more efficient communication with clients
because of the enhanced availability, portability, and efficiency of electronic
communication.154 The opinion, however, also discussed the possibility that
the information could fall victim to hackers who possess the skills and
knowledge necessary to overcome the security protecting the electronic
media.155 Therefore, the opinion holds that an attorney has an affirmative duty
to take reasonable steps to protect the client’s information.156
Under the New Jersey rule, just as an attorney must shred files that contain
confidential information before they are deposited in the trash, the attorney
must ensure that his electronic files are not subject to interception or
manipulation.157 Importantly, the opinion also holds that reasonable care does
not require the attorney to absolutely guarantee that the information will not
fall prey to hackers, because such a guarantee is impossible even for network
professionals.158 Rather, reasonable care is based upon the technology that is
“reasonably available at the time to secure data against unintentional
disclosure.”159
The New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics established a
two-part test for determining if an attorney has met his or her duty of
reasonable care. First, if the attorney has entrusted confidential documents to
a third-party vendor, there is “an enforceable obligation to preserve [client]
confidentiality and security . . . .”160 Second, the attorney must use “available
technology” to protect client files against “reasonably foreseeable attempts to
infiltrate the data.”161 In other words, to satisfy his or her ethical duties under
this rule, the attorney must advise any third-party vendors that they must
comply with the duty of confidentiality, and the attorney must use technology
to avoid “reasonably foreseeable” hacking attempts. Because technology

153. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 701 (2006), available at http://lawlibrary.
rutgers.edu/ethics/acpe/acp701_1.html.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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expands and develops so rapidly, an attorney under this model must be agile
and adapt to the changes.162
Thus, under the stronger model, a state ethics opinion expressly creates an
affirmative duty upon the attorney to ensure that electronic files are secure.
Likewise, the New Jersey model expressly imposes a duty of network security
upon attorneys. Nevertheless, even the New Jersey Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics explicitly declined to define the specific steps that an
attorney should take to ethically secure electronic files on a network.163
Surprisingly, the American Bar Association (ABA) has taken a progressive
stance on computer ethics, and the ABA opinions, while not binding, are
helpful in determining, from a multistate perspective, the future of the law of
computer ethics.
C. The American Bar Association
The American Bar Association has issued some helpful, albeit controversial
ethics opinions regarding electronic technology and Model Rule 1.6. In a
1999 ethics opinion, the ABA held that an attorney may typically use
unencrypted e-mail to transmit confidential information.164 The ABA based
their determination, in part, upon the reasonable expectation of privacy that
attorneys have in their electronic communications.165 Reasoning that the
expectation of privacy in electronic communication is similar to traditional
means of message transmission, using e-mail does not run afoul of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.166 The ABA’s caveat, however, warns that the
client should be advised of the dangers of communicating through e-mail,
especially when the information transmitted is highly sensitive or
prejudicial.167
162. See id. The New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics stated:
In 1983, for instance, when Opinion 515 was published, the personal computer
was still somewhat of a novelty, and the individual floppy disk was the prevailing
data storage device. The “state of the art” in maintaining electronic security was
not very developed, but the ability to prevent unauthorized access by physically
securing the floppy disk itself satisfied us that confidentiality could be maintained.
By implication, at the time we were less accepting of data stored on a shared hard
drive, even one that was partitioned to provide for individual private space for use
by different firms, because of the risk of breach of confidentiality under prevailing
technology.
Id.
163. See generally id.
164. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
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The dangers of e-mail were highlighted by a speaker in 2005 at the ABA
National Conference on Professional Responsibility in Chicago. Arguing that
“[t]echnology is a wonderful tool, but like a sharp knife it can be dangerous,”
speaker David Bloom noted that e-mail is often sent to incorrect recipients
despite reasonable effort.168 Despite the dangers, the ABA and a healthy
majority of states take the position that e-mail encryption is not required in
most cases. Because of the degree to which the ABA allows attorneys to
communicate without encryption, its stance falls under the weaker model of
e-mail regulatory schemes.
The ABA’s position on metadata differs from that of many states. The
ABA surprised many in the legal community in 2006 when the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Ethics
Opinion 06-442, holding that attorneys may ethically search for and use
metadata hidden within otherwise knowingly disclosed documents.169 This
metadata could lead to the discovery of confidential information.170
Acknowledging that “lawyers regularly receive e-mail [and other electronic
documents] from opposing counsel,”171 the ABA requires attorneys who
inadvertently receive confidential information in the form of metadata to only
“promptly notify the sender.”172 In part, the ABA reasoned that attorneys
could take reasonable steps to “scrub” the documents of metadata with a
simple technological procedure, thereby eliminating the problem.173 Thus,
because a simple, reasonable technical solution exists that should have been
employed by the sending attorney, the ABA places the burden upon that
attorney to protect the information.174
Encouragingly, the opinion offered specific, practical guidance to avoid
inadvertently sending documents that contain metadata to opposing parties.175
To satisfy the ABA’s recommendations, first, an attorney should avoid using
the “redlining function” of a word processor, which allows the program to
track revision changes.176 Second, an attorney should not “embed” comments
within a document, because the comments could later be discovered by the
168. Darshana T. Lele, Confidentiality: Speakers Reveal Perils and Benefits of Using
Technology in Law Practice, 21 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 310, 310 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
169. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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recipient of the document.177 Third, an attorney should “scrub” the metadata
before the document is sent, remaining mindful of any rules that would
prohibit altering documents before discovery.178 Fourth, a confidentiality or
protective agreement could be negotiated that would not allow metadata to be
used in evidence.179 Although not listed in the ABA’s recommendations, many
of the problems associated with metadata in word processing documents can
also be avoided by saving the document as an image, which should be done for
electronically delivered documents as a best practice, regardless of metadata.180
The ABA is fairly permissive in terms of electronic storage of client files.
In 1995, the ABA issued an advisory opinion relating to third-party vendors
and what access they should have to confidential client information.181
Holding that the attorney “must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
company has in place, or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the
confidentiality of client information,” the ABA states attorneys may employ
computer maintenance companies without breaching their duties of
confidentiality.182 Nevertheless, under the rule, the attorney still holds the
ultimate responsibility for any breach.183 No ABA opinions explicitly define
the specific steps that an attorney should take to secure electronic client files.
There is no universal bright-line rule that controls the ethics of network
security. Nevertheless, based upon the ethics opinions that cover e-mail,
inadvertent disclosure, metadata, and electronic storage of documents, a
number of conclusions may be distilled. Attorneys owe a duty to their clients
to act in conformity with the ethical and professional standards applicable to
their respective areas of practice.184 Failure to conform with these standards
can be grounds for malpractice.185 Computers and technology add an entirely
new spectrum to the ethical duties owed to the client. “While computers give
tremendous benefits to legal organizations in terms of efficiency, productivity,
and delivery of high-quality legal services to clients, they also create

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. If a document is saved as an “image,” or picture, there can be no textual revision history
contained in the document, since all that is being transmitted is data tantamount to a digital
photograph of the document. Image files may include files saved in JPG, PDF, TIFF, and other
formats.
181. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 (1995).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 47 (2004); see also State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Champion, 1970 OK 36, 468 P.2d 794.
185. See Champion, 1970 OK 36, 468 P.2d 794.
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substantial ethical issues.”186 Because there is no universal rule regarding
attorney computer security, the ABA has issued some technical
recommendations that should at least be considered by attorneys in all states,
and should be carefully observed in those states who closely mirror the
requirements of the ABA. One state, however, stands above the rest in terms
of defining, with a great deal of precision, the explicit steps that an attorney
should take to prevent hackers from stealing confidential information.
Oklahoma provides the framework by which attorneys can rest assured that
their ethical duties are satisfied.
IV. Oklahoma as the Model State
Oklahoma has a strong background in legal technology. It was one of the
first states to publish a complete, publicly accessible version of its statutes,
ethics opinions, reported cases, and other legal material.187 Accessible and
searchable at no cost, the Oklahoma Supreme Court Network website provides
the public with a relatively efficient means of performing state and regionallevel legal research.188 Poised in this progressive stance, Oklahoma allows
interested parties to search through ethical codes and opinions online,
including materials that help attorneys understand their ethical duties with
respect to technology. Further, Oklahoma’s embrace of technology in the law
is not limited to electronic legal research.
Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 requires attorneys to “provide
competent representation to a client,” which includes “the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”189 Oklahoma Rule 1.1 is identical to Model Rule 1.1.190
Several states have interpreted Model Rule 1.1 to impose duties upon attorneys
to achieve competency not just with matters of the law, but with the computer
hardware and software with which attorneys represent their clients.191 Thus,
186. ROPER, supra note 5, at 43; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003)
(stating that an attorney has a duty to act with “reasonable diligence and promptness”).
187. See M.G. Gallagher Law Library, Univ. of Wash., Website of the Week, Feb. 12, 2001,
http://lib.law.washington.edu/webweek/2001/Feb122001.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
188. OSCN: The Oklahoma Supreme Court Network, http://www.oscn.net (last visited Jan.
5, 2008).
189. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
190. Compare id., with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
191. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04
(2005), available at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/pdf/05-04.pdf (“[A]n attorney or law firm
is obligated to take reasonable and competent steps to assure that the client’s electronic
information is not lost or destroyed. In order to do that, an attorney must be competent to
evaluate the nature of the potential threat to client electronic files and to evaluate and deploy
appropriate computer hardware and software to accomplish that end.”); Fla. Bar, Prof’l Ethics
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although Oklahoma does not explicitly include computer competency in
Oklahoma Rule 1.1, the modern trend of Model Rule 1.1 interpretations could
require Oklahoma attorneys to achieve competency with the tools used in the
law practice. Further, this duty includes “adequate preparation,” and can
require an attorney to “engage in continuing study and education” to achieve
competency.192 This could require an Oklahoma attorney to participate in
continuing education to remain competent in new computer technology.
Addressing computer competency more directly is Rule 1.6 of the
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct.193 The previous version of
Oklahoma Rule 1.6(a) provided “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client,” subject to limited exceptions.194 For the
purposes of computer confidentiality, former Oklahoma Rule 1.6(a) was the
same as Model Rule 1.6(a).195 Former Oklahoma Rule 1.6 imposed an
affirmative duty upon the attorney to maintain client confidentiality, stating
that “the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary
disclosure of information relating to a representation . . . .”196 Some states
have interpreted similar language in the comment section of Model Rule 1.6
as imposing a duty upon the attorney to protect confidential client information
stored electronically on computers.197 As written, former Oklahoma Rule 1.6
did not specifically mention computer technology.
Under recently adopted changes to the Oklahoma Rules of Professional
Conduct, however, Oklahoma addresses electronic communication and an
attorney’s duty to secure electronic client files.198 Re-adopting Model Rule
1.6(a) with some changes, the recently adopted Oklahoma Rule 1.6(a) reads:
“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent, [subject to some exceptions] . . . .”199
Further, two comments to the new Oklahoma Rule 1.6 address the issue of

Comm., Op. 06-2 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/ (follow “Search” hyperlink;
then follow “Ethics Opinions” hyperlink; then search for “06-2”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm.
on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Ethics_Opinions&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=6871.
192. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2007).
193. Id. R. 1.6.
194. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2001), amended by OKLA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).
195. Compare id., with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
196. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2001) (emphasis added).
197. See supra Part III.B.
198. See OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).
199. Id.
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third parties accessing client information, placing a duty upon the attorney to
prevent disclosure.200
Comment 16 to the new Oklahoma Rule 1.6 requires a lawyer to “act
competently to safeguard [client] information,” guarding the data “against
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure . . . .”201 This language of “inadvertent
or unauthorized disclosure” is absent from the previous version of Oklahoma
Rule 1.6.202 This additional language may indicate a shift in emphasis by the
Oklahoma Bar Association, highlighting the importance of client
confidentiality. By holding the attorney responsible for preventing even
unauthorized breaches of confidentiality, the proposed rules tacitly require an
attorney to secure electronic files from discovery by third parties.
Further, another comment in the new Oklahoma Rule 1.6 places a duty upon
the attorney to prevent confidential information from electronically being
delivered to unauthorized recipients.203 Comment 17 states that “[w]hen
transmitting a communication that includes [confidential information], the
lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from
coming into the hands of unintended recipients.”204 Further, the rule requires
the attorney to take “special security measures” if the type of communication
does not provide a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”205 To determine if
additional security is required, an Oklahoma attorney should consider “the
sensitivity of the information and the extent to which privacy of the
communication is protected . . . .”206 Most importantly, under this revision,
“the client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not
required by [Oklahoma Rule 1.6]” and may consent to less security than the
Oklahoma Rule 1.6 requires.207
Although not specifically mentioned, revised Oklahoma Rule 1.6 probably
applies to e-mail and Internet-based delivery methods of client documents.
Comment 17 discusses “transmitting” a confidential document, departing from
language that would indicate mailing or other traditional delivery.208 Further,
the comment places a duty upon the attorney to take “special security
measures,” which is far more applicable to electronic communications than

200. Id. R. 1.6 cmts. 16-17.
201. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (emphasis added).
202. See OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001), amended by OKLA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
203. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007

580

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:547

traditional methods of confidential delivery.209 Finally, by requiring the
attorney to consider the “sensitivity of the information” and the “extent to
which [the communication] is protected,” the rule seems to exclude
traditionally accepted means of document delivery.210
Thus, as the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct have evolved to meet
the requirements of modern legal practice, Oklahoma is further poised to lead
the states in computer ethics regulation. Nevertheless, Oklahoma’s guidance
is not limited to formal rules and proposed interpretations. Rather, Jim
Calloway of the Oklahoma Bar Association has taken progressive steps to help
attorneys merge into a new age of technology. Of particular importance to
understanding Oklahoma computer ethics are Calloway’s Oklahoma Bar
Journal articles.
The Oklahoma Bar Journal includes practitioner-oriented articles that
address the sometimes complex issue of electronic file security. Particularly
helpful is an advisory article published in the 1998 Oklahoma Bar Journal that
discusses the steps prudent attorneys should take to secure the electronic files
on their network.211 In this article, Jim Calloway and Dan Murdock of the
Oklahoma Bar Association embrace the advantages of the Internet as a legal
tool, noting that “a lawyer who does not have Internet access operates at a
substantial disadvantage to his colleagues who do, and, most of the time, does
not realize that the disadvantage even exists.”212 Further, Calloway and
Murdock outline specific means by which an attorney should protect electronic
files from unauthorized discovery.213 First, a strong password policy is
essential.214 Passwords are sometimes the primary layer of defense between
a document and an unauthorized party, and weak passwords can be overcome
more easily. Second, backups should be used often and at least one copy
should be stored in a location that is geographically separate from the law
firm.215 While many attorneys may understand the importance of backing up
electronic files, the technological barriers associated with establishing an
automated backup routine prevents some practitioners from adhering to the
backup schedule. Thus, an automated backup system is a better means of
ensuring the integrity of client files. Third, the attorney should employ a
written confidentiality policy that must be signed by all people who have
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Jim Calloway & Dan Murdock, Attorney Advertising in Cyberspace, 69 OKLA. B.J.
2597 (1998).
212. Id. at 2597.
213. Id. at 2601-03.
214. Id. at 2601.
215. Id.
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physical access to the files.216 While this tactic will not affirmatively take
information out of the reach of third-party vendors, it at least puts the
signatory parties on notice that information discovered therein is confidential
and may not be disclosed. Fourth, the attorney should take steps to physically
secure the computers that house the electronic documents.217 Electronic
security is of little value if the attorney leaves his notebook computer with
confidential information on the courthouse desk, or allows an unscrupulous
employee physical access to the physical components of the office computers.
Fifth, the attorney should always check references and perform background
checks on new or temporary employees.218 Sixth, policies should be enacted
that prevent unauthorized staff from gaining access to unnecessary confidential
information.219 These steps may include, but are not limited to, restricting the
rights of the employee user accounts, limiting the hours during which users
may connect, and auditing user activities. Each of these six practical
recommendations will be discussed and expanded upon in Part V of this
comment.220
Further, in the November 2006 issue of the Oklahoma Bar Journal,
Calloway and others explored security tactics that lawyers who use portable
computers should employ.221 Recognizing that personal computers are
frequently stolen, the authors argued that attorneys should diligently guard
their portable computers to preserve confidential files.222 In addition, the
article suggested that attorneys pay closer attention to USB flash drives and
other means of temporary storage that, because of their compact nature, could
be easily stolen.223 These electronic storage devices could later be mined for
confidential information. Additionally, this article addressed the issue of
metadata indicating that the duty is upon the sending party to ensure client
confidentiality.224 Stating that “[s]ending a document to opposing counsel that
potentially exposes the client’s comments made while reviewing the document
could constitute a major ethical breach,” the authors highlight the importance
of proactively screening documents for unintended information.225 This is the
216. Id. at 2602.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Ellen Freedman et al., A Lawyer’s Guide to Mobile Computer Security, 77 OKLA. B.J.
3085 (2006).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 3088-89.
224. Id. at 3086.
225. Id. The article makes several suggestions about how sending metadata can be easily
avoided, such as creating a clean document, or saving the file in PDF (portable document
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better approach, because attorneys who send the information are, or should be,
in a better position to protect client files. By placing the burden of maintaining
confidentiality on the sending attorney, the authors promote zealous advocacy,
client confidentiality, and the adversarial system.
Calloway has addressed numerous other aspects of computer ethics and the
practice of law. In 1997, Calloway highlighted the importance of computer
disaster recovery and electronic backups of client files.226 In 2000, he
discussed the potential dangers of high speed Internet connections and how the
Internet can expose confidential files to hackers.227 In 2003, he outlined how
attorneys can commit “computer malpractice,” and some means by which it
can be avoided.228 Finally, in 2005, he explained how any law firm can backup
electronic client files, meeting their ethical obligations.229 Thus, Jim Calloway
has helped Oklahoma attorneys better understand the ethical implications of
computers in the law office.
Calloway’s influence is not limited to Oklahoma Bar Journal articles. For
the more technologically savvy attorneys, Calloway hosts a blog that contains
helpful information about the use of technology in law.230 These practice tips
are invaluable for both technological neophytes and relatively advanced users,
and help attorneys bridge the gap between technology and law. Further,
Calloway’s legal technology practice tips, published on the Oklahoma Bar
Association’s website, help attorneys understand both the perils and
advantages of law office technology.231
Although Oklahoma has taken a progressive stance in defining the ethical
implications of computer use, potential for improvement still remains. In the
future, Oklahoma should publish ethics opinions defining the rights and
responsibilities of parties who receive electronic information through
misdirected e-mail and metadata. Because the sending attorney has the duty
to maintain confidentiality, he or she should bear the burden of ensuring that
confidentiality is preserved. This includes, but is not limited to, ensuring that
files in e-mails are password-protected, ensuring that the recipients are
intended, and ensuring that third parties do not have access to the client’s eformat).
226. Jim Calloway, Are You Prepared for a Real Disaster?, 68 OKLA. B.J. 3995 (1997).
227. Calloway, supra note 24.
228. Jim Calloway, Malpractice or Ethical Violations with Your Computer, 74 OKLA. B.J.
3450 (2003).
229. Jim Calloway, A Backup Proposal for Those Who Know That They Aren’t Doing
Backup Well, 76 OKLA. B.J. 2683 (2005).
230. Jim Calloway’s Law Practice Tips Blog, http://jimcalloway.typepad.com/lawpractice
tips/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
231. Oklahoma Bar Association: Management Assistance Program, http://www.okbar.org/
members/map/articles/article_list.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
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mail. If the sending attorney erroneously sends electronic communication to
an inappropriate third party, the sending attorney should bear the loss, and the
receiving party should zealously represent his or her client and use any
information possible from the document. Further, because metadata can be
easily eliminated, Oklahoma should allow recipient attorneys to mine
electronic documents for hidden information.
In the meantime, absent an all-inclusive, explicit rule, the reasonable
practitioner must understand what steps must be taken to secure his or her
electronic files. Inherently fuzzy, reasonableness means different things for
different attorneys. For example, a large firm should have more resources
available to consult third parties regarding network security, while a smaller
firm may be required to take preventative measures solitarily. Likewise,
whereas an attorney may have a reasonably secure network for dealing with
a specific client or set of clients, the security needs may be enhanced if the
firm accepts a client with particularly sensitive needs and concerns. Thus, the
tools and considerations in Part V should be used to help the attorney both
understand his or her duties under the law and take the steps required to secure
his or her computer network.
V. Defining Reasonableness—An Attorney’s Guide to Understanding the
Standards and Recommendations of Computer Ethics and Security
The cornerstone of confidentiality is the idea that an attorney must take
reasonable steps to ensure that the client’s information remains confidential.
Thus, the standard can shift depending on the facts and circumstances of each
office and each case. The concept of reasonableness is a cornerstone of the
legal profession, because it allows for argument on either side of the spectrum.
Nevertheless, it is less than satisfying when utilized to help an attorney
understand what steps should be taken to shield him- or herself from breaching
the rules of ethics. Attempting to draw some practical guidelines, an effective
means of measuring reasonableness is weighing the probability and gravity of
a hacking attack against the burden which must be undertaken by an attorney
to prevent the attack.
Attorneys need not completely withdraw their computers containing client
files from the Internet in order to take the requisite “reasonable” steps to
protect client confidentiality.232 While that would certainly satisfy the
professional duties of the attorney and minimize the risk of loss, it would
232. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 05-04 (2005),
available at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/pdf/05-04.pdf (holding that “[i]t is not unethical
to store such electronic information on computer systems whether or not those same systems
are used to connect to the internet” (emphasis added)).
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unreasonably burden business efficiency.233 Likewise, the solution is not to
connect to the Internet without security, despite the ease, because both the
gravity and likelihood of attack would increase exponentially.234 Thus, the
solution lies between the two poles.
Just as attorneys cannot ensure that a burglar will not break into their offices
and steal information, they cannot absolutely guarantee the safety of electronic
files. If the battle between the law firm and the hacker is an intellectual,
strategic series of measures and countermeasures akin to a chess match, the
end-game for the attorney is to produce a stalemate. Further, “[t]here is no
tried-and-true training that can make [an attorney] a security expert, but there
are some baseline principles, skills, and tools that must be mastered to become
proficient in this field.”235 Too much network security can be expensive,
counter-productive, and difficult to implement, while too little security
exposes the firm to lost productivity at best, and potential financial liability at
worst. By balancing the probability and gravity of attack against the attorney’s
burden of preventing attack, the attorney can better understand why proactive
steps are required, as well as which steps should be taken to secure client files.
A. The Probability of a Hacking Attack and Unintended Disclosure of
Confidential Information
Hacking attacks are more prevalent than most attorneys might presume. In
a 2006 ABA survey, 14.8% of attorneys indicated that their firm had been
attacked by a hacker, up more than 3% since 2005.236 Shockingly, an
overwhelming 39.2% of attorneys did not know if they had been victims of an
attack, including 19.8% of solo practitioners.237 Of the attorneys who reported
hacking attacks in 2004 and 2005, 14.3% indicated the attack resulted in the
destruction of electronic files.238 Further, in 2006, 3% of attorneys indicated

233. For example, as long as a secure connection to the Internet can be established, attorneys
can remotely access information stored on their office network. This could be invaluable in the
event of, for example, forgetting an important document essential for a remote deposition. If
secure remote access is properly configured on the network, an attorney can “tunnel” through
the Internet, gain access to the office network with proper credentials, copy the file, and use it
at a remote location, all within a matter of minutes. This added efficiency also helps eliminate
unnecessary billable hours, thereby allowing attorneys to better serve their clients.
234. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 701 (2006), available at http://lawlibrary.
rutgers.edu/ethics/acpe/acp701_1.html.
235. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at xvi.
236. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 33, at 35; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 8, at 39.
237. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 33, at 34.
238. Id. at 39.
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“unauthorized access to sensitive client data,” and 4.8% indicated
“unauthorized access to other (non-client) sensitive data.”239
CERT, an organization that tracks and compiles statistical information
relating to Internet-based security issues and compromises, lists 38,348 total
security vulnerabilities that have been reported from 1995 and the third quarter
of 2007, with 5,568 incidents reported in the first three quarters of 2007
alone.240 More shockingly, the total number of reported incidents of attack
against Internet-connected systems was 319,922 from 1988 and 2003.241 One
incident of attack in this report can include from one to thousands of affected
computers.242
Perhaps because of the aforementioned increasing popularity of wireless
networks, even networking professionals can fall victim to expensive hacking
attacks.243 As noted in Part II.B, because of the extraordinary number of
wireless network attacks, security is “a practical necessity that has become a
reality for today’s wireless networks.”244 Determining what the appropriate
level of security is for any given wireless network is an essential, practical skill
for attorneys who use wireless networks.
Further, while the attacks are becoming more complex, the tools used to
facilitate these attacks are becoming easier to use and more readily available.
This enhanced availability provides more people that lack specific technical
knowledge the ability to perform a malicious attack.245 Specifically, many
effective hacking tools are available for download on the Internet at no cost.
For example, Brutus, an effective brute-force security cracking program, may
be downloaded directly from the developer.246 Brutus may be used to defeat
form-based website authentication services. This prevalence of hacking tools
increases the probability of attack.

239. Id. at 35.
240. CERT Statistics: Full Statistics, http://www.cert.org/stats/fullstats.html (last visited Jan.
5, 2008).
241. Id. Company websites are one of the most attractive targets for novice hackers;
typically the hacker will deface the site in some form, harming the goodwill and professional
image (by making customers uncertain of the business’s ability to protect confidential
information) of the business. Some websites, such as Attrition.org (http://www.attrition.org)
track hacked sites and archive images of the defacement; there are thousands of sites in the
archive. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 7.
242. CERT Statistics: Full Statistics, supra note 240. CERT stopped monitoring these
incidents of attack after 2003.
243. VACCA, supra note 47, at 164.
244. Id.
245. PAQUET & SAXE, supra note 51, at 5.
246. Brutus is available for download from the developer at http://www.hoobie.net/brutus/.
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B. The Severity of Hacking Attacks
Discouragingly, the attacks also seem to be increasing in terms of
severity.247 As just one example, “[i]n the United States alone, $2.6 billion
was spent to undo the damage created by the code red virus, a malicious worm
that exploited a known software vulnerability in certain servers.”248 In
addition, “[i]n January 2003, the worm SQL Slammer slowed the Internet and
infected 75,000 systems in only ten minutes. The net result was damage and
cleanup that totaled $1 billion.”249 Further, “[i]n 2004, 74% of all businesses
surveyed in the [United Kingdom] reported suffering at least one security
incident during the prior year, up from 44% four years earlier,” with 68% of
these victims claiming that the attacks on their businesses were malicious.250
Hacking attacks are especially harmful to law offices, both in terms of
actual loss and “collateral damage.”251 While most attorneys might expect
losses in the form of destroyed files, the more important losses might include
lost client trust.252 For example, if a client or a potential client notices that an
attorney’s website has been hacked and defaced, it might make the client less
likely to entrust the attorney with highly sensitive confidential information.253
Because lost revenue and stagnant growth can occur as a collateral loss, the
psychological impact on the firm can be more expensive than the lost
documents.
Hackers can also allow themselves an opportunity to eavesdrop on what the
attorney believes to be private conversations. For example, hackers can install
programs and configure options on the computer that allow them to easily
regain access to the system. If the computer is equipped with hardware, such
as a microphone or a webcam, a moderately skilled hacker can use the
attorney’s computer like an electronic surveillance device. In the ultimate
irony, the attorney seeking to maintain the confidentiality of client information
could disclose that information though a hacker’s observation of an office
meeting over a computer.
C. The Burden of Deploying Network Security
The burden of deploying network security can be great. Like many things
in life, there is little to be gained in delusion; constructing and maintaining a
secure information technology infrastructure can be costly. The cost required
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

PAQUET & SAXE, supra note 51, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
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to secure a law firm varies wildly, depending upon the degree of security
required and the number of computer systems used in the firm. Not
surprisingly, only 34.7% of solo practitioners budgeted for technology in
2006, compared to 85.1% in large firms.254 Of the solo practitioners who did
budget for technology, 53.1% allocated less than $2,500.255 In contrast, at least
6.7% of firms of 100 or more attorneys had a budget in excess of $2 million,
with another 11.7% budgeting from $100 thousand to $1.9 million.256
Consequentially, from 2004 to 2006, approximately 41% of attorneys had no
professional technical employees that helped manage the computer systems.257
17% employed one person, 8% employed two, 9% employed three to four, and
29% employed “five or more technical support staff.”258
Because deploying adequate security measures can be expensive, it can be
difficult for an attorney, especially a solo practitioner, to justify this cost. This
is especially true when a third-party vendor must be employed to ensure an
adequate level of security. Particularly unsettling for the frugal attorney is that
computer security does not directly produce income or observable results.
Unlike purchasing office chairs and stationary, which the attorney may see and
touch, the only real measurement of a successful security configuration is the
lack of a successful hacking attack.259
Nevertheless, several facts help constructively reduce the cost of network
security deployment. First, while the expenditures can be great at the point of
initial deployment, they drop to a near incidental level after this first expense.
The primary cost after the initial configuration includes maintaining an
adequate level of security.260 Second, while a law office must deploy a
reasonable amount of security, the protection required will not ordinarily be
as great as other organizations, such as banks and governmental security
departments. Thus, “Fort Knox” security is not necessarily required, and the
ordinary firm should be able to deploy an adequate security system for less
than $1000.261 Third, many software tools used to protect and test network
security are readily available on the Internet for no cost and others can be
254. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 33, at 14.
255. Id. at 15.
256. Id. at 15-18.
257. Id. at vii.
258. Id.
259. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 1.
260. Some software and hardware vendors, such as Microsoft, offer free updates and patches
to correct newly discovered weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Microsoft’s updates are available
at http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com.
261. If attorneys can take steps to secure their networks unilaterally, the cost of security is
dramatically reduced. The $1000 benchmark should cover the cost of an inexpensive hardware
firewall, any essential software, and reasonable installation and configuration fees.
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licensed for a nominal fee. This ordinarily allows attorneys to shop for the
best product and constantly remain vigilant in their network security
configuration without consulting a costly third-party vendor. Fourth, the
Internet has numerous free resources that can help attorneys understand
specific details about network security for law offices, ranging from basic
“technology 101” articles to specific, in-depth coverage of specific subject
areas. Finally, like other business expenses, the cost of securing a network
should be either deducted or capitalized, depending upon the applicable
section of the Internal Revenue Code.262
Thus, while the gravity and probability of a hacking attack are high, the
burden of deploying network security is relatively low. Therefore, deploying
network security is a reasonable step that should be taken by an attorney who
seeks to preserve his or her clients’ confidential information. Nevertheless,
while the state ethics opinions are helpful in outlining answers to narrow
questions such as whether e-mail encryption is required, or whether files can
be stored electronically, few opinions offer direct, practical guidance to law
firms who seek to take precise measures to secure their networks. Relying
upon the totality of the opinions, Part V.D seeks to define the direct steps that
should be taken by an attorney in any state in order to reasonably and ethically
secure their networks.
D. Meeting the Burden—Recommended Network and Computer Security
As referenced in Part IV, no states have published an advisory article that
fluently and skillfully outlines direct measures attorneys should take to secure
their networks other than the Oklahoma Bar Journal technology outlines.263
Because the Oklahoma Bar Journal leads the nation in outlining proper,
practical security procedures for attorneys, they should be relied upon as a
basic framework for network security. Nevertheless, because of the rapid
evolution in technology and the importance of client confidentiality, relying
upon the articles alone is insufficient to reasonably secure a law office
network. To an attorney, it may seem to be a monumental, if not impossible
task to manage both the legal and business aspects of a law office, as well as
work as a de facto computer professional. However, despite the hype,
reasonably securing a computer network does not require a substantial amount
of skill or effort. It is “not very hard, or even expensive, [for an attorney] to
solve the [security] problem. Usually it’s just a silly lapse or laziness that

262. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (2000).
263. See Calloway & Murdock, supra note 211.
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leads to data protection problems.”264 To that end, the following steps should
be taken by attorneys who want to protect electronic files.
1. Passwords
One of the most significant vulnerabilities in modern computer systems is
weak passwords.265 Thus, it is essential to implement a strong password
policy.266 Optimally, a user should change his or her password at periodic
intervals.267 Short intervals are better, because “the longer a password is used,
the greater the likelihood that it has been compromised.268 In addition,
alphanumeric passwords consisting of eight characters or more should be used
whenever possible.269 Likewise, passwords should absolutely never be a
dictionary word, because many hacking programs can, within seconds, crack
any password in the dictionary.270 Obviously, the password should also not be
something that may be easily guessed, like a child’s name, or that could be
easily discovered upon physical examination of the workspace.271
The optimal password’s characteristics would include an alphanumeric
mixture of upper and lower case characters.272 It should include special
characters, preferably toward the middle of the password.273 A password
should not consist of a popular word or phrase, and should exceed eight
characters.274 Password changing policies and schedules can be easily
configured in modern Microsoft Windows operating systems. Steps should
also be taken to ensure that the system blocks access to the computer for a
limited time in the event that a user incorrectly enters a password a suspicious
number of times.275
264. Krause, supra note 25, at 25.
265. Weak passwords exhibit some (or all) of the following negative characteristics: (1)
short length; (2) all upper or lower-case; (3) all numbers or all letters; (4) non-diverse
characters; (5) unexpiring passwords; and (6) comprised of a term that is easily guessed. PAUL
REID, BIOMETRICS FOR NETWORK SECURITY 11 (2004).
266. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 41.
267. See BILL MCCARTY, LEARNING RED HAT ENTERPRISE LINUX & FEODRA 185 (4th ed.
2004).
268. Id.
269. PAQUET & SAXE, supra note 51, at 267.
270. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 41.
271. This could include, for example, the practice of writing passwords on post-it notes and
storing the notes beneath the keyboard.
272. See SUDHANSHU KAIRAB, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURITY ASSESSMENTS 396 (2005).
273. Id.
274. JACK J. CHAMPLAIN, AUDITING INFORMATION SYSTEMS 145 (2d ed. 2003).
275. Multiple incorrect guesses can indicate a potential hacking attempt. A “group policy”
can be set to lock an account should this occur. To configure group policy in Windows XP,
open the Group Policy Editor and navigate to Computer Configuration/Windows
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An attorney who fails to configure a strong password system can allow a
hacker to gain access to confidential client information. Because even an
unauthorized user can gain access to confidential files with the correct
password, ensuring compliance with these password recommendations is vital.
By enforcing a strong password policy, an attorney will have taken the first
step to reasonably secure electronic files. Nevertheless, additional security
must also be configured.
2. Backups, Disaster Recovery, and Data Redundancy
One of the most important things that an attorney can do is develop a data
redundancy plan.276 Nevertheless, few attorneys follow backup plans.277 In a
2006 ABA study, only 25.8% of responding attorneys indicated that backups
were performed daily.278 Over sixty percent of the responding attorneys
reported their firm backed up data in intervals of one week or greater.279
Larger firms backup data more frequently than smaller firms. While 4.5% of
firms with over 100 attorneys backup their information more than twice daily,
only 1.9% of solo practitioners are this cautious.280 This disparity could be due
to additional technological resources or enhanced need.
Not surprisingly, larger firms also use more robust backup practices. Fiftyfive percent of solo practitioners use optical drives, such as writable CDs and
DVDs, to backup information.281 The danger with this method is that the
media is fragile, and anything from an office fire to a scratch could eviscerate
the backups. Only 12.2% of firms with fifty to ninety-nine attorneys, and 3%
of firms with 100 or more attorneys prefer this method.282 However, attorneys
in small firms are more aware of the data backup policies than attorneys in
larger firms.283 While only 5% of the solo practitioners were unaware of what
type of media was used for backups, a whopping 73.7% of the large firm
attorneys remained ignorant.284 This difference is probably the result of the
Settings/Security Settings/Account Policies/Account Lockout Policy and define the account
lockout duration to be at least a few minutes, and the threshold to be less than five invalid logon
attempts. See Implementing and Troubleshooting Account Lockout, http://www.window
security.com/articles/Implementing-Troubleshooting-Account-Lockout.html (last visited Jan.
5, 2008).
276. Krause, supra note 25, at 31.
277. Id.
278. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 33, at 38.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. Id.
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ability of large firms to hire networking and data professionals to configure
and complete a data backup system.
Shockingly, 46.2% of attorneys in law firms either do not have or do not
know if they have a disaster recovery plan.285 Cost seems to influence these
figures. While 57.4% of solo practitioners, nearly as high a percentage as the
largest firms, have disaster recovery plans, there may be weaknesses in how
the plans are formed.286 For example, while no firms of ten or more attorneys
report placing an associate attorney in charge of protecting the information,
over 90% of solo practitioners are responsible for performing their own
backups.287 This could be expensive in terms of time if not managed properly.
Because cost is a factor, an attorney’s backup schedule will depend heavily
upon the type of firm in which he or she practices. When determining the
frequency by which backups should be performed, the attorney should
consider how much work he or she is willing to lose.288 An inappropriate
backup schedule can expose an attorney to disaster in the event of a hacking
attack, viral infection, or environmental disaster.289 “Large law firms [should
ensure] that information is saved on file servers, backed up daily and stored
off-site at a secure location.”290 For other firms, if off-site backups are not an
option, the attorney should consider storing data on rotating tape backup drives
that can be stored in a fireproof safe. At a minimum, copies of files should be
transmitted to temporary media, such as USB or CD-RW discs, or to a portable
hard drive. Backing up files does not have to be expensive, or even especially
difficult. Microsoft has published a tutorial on Windows XP’s integrated
backup utility, and other backup scheduling software is available.291 With a
properly configured backup system, the data should be protected with virtually
no additional effort.292
At least one court was unwilling to forgive an attorney whose computer
negligence resulted in the destruction of client files. In the case of In re Ward,
a North Dakota attorney accepted $6000.00 as a retainer for a case.293 In 2003,
when the representation was complete, the attorney claimed the fee, but could

285. Id. at 37.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Krause, supra note 25, at 31.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. For Microsoft’s recommendations on using the Windows XP backup tools, see
Windows XP: Back Up Your Files, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/setup/
maintain/backupfiles.mspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
292. See generally id.
293. In re Ward, 701 N.W.2d 873 (N.D. 2005).
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not produce his record of time on an invoice.294 The physical files
documenting the time spent were taken by a person with a power of attorney
for the client, the attorney claimed.295 The electronic documents were
destroyed by a computer virus.296 Finding that the destruction of his records
by a virus did not relieve the attorney of his ethical obligations, the court
issued him a reprimand and a fine.297
Thus, in order to protect client files, an attorney must establish a means by
which electronic files may be recovered in the event of a loss.298 Any backup
policy is better than none, thus, an attorney should at least back up files on
removable media, such as CD-RW, DVD-RW, or USB storage devices.299
Ideally, firms should enact robust backup procedures that protect client
information from the dangers of hackers, viruses, and environmental
disasters.300 Nevertheless, an attorney must also ensure that his or her
computers that contain electronic client files are secure.
3. Physical Security
Despite the complex network security measures that are enabled to prevent
an unauthorized user from remotely accessing resources, if an unscrupulous
person is able to gain physical access to an improperly secured machine, the
person can perform a tremendous amount of harm in a small amount of time.
For example, a Linux LiveCD301 may be used to mount the file system that was
previously secured by a password because the CD loads a small Linux
operating system in memory. This can result in a catastrophe, because the
attackers have access to all of the information that was previously shielded by
a user password.302 The attacker also has the opportunity to either clear the
administrator password or steal the Windows “hash” files, which can be later

294. Id. at 874-75.
295. Id. at 877.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Calloway, supra note 226.
299. Id.
300. See generally Krause, supra note 25, at 31.
301. A LiveCD is a bootable version of Linux designed to operate in temporary memory
space. One consequence of using a LiveCD is that a user need not have privileges to install
software in order to use the LiveCD. In fact, anyone with physical access to the machine and
the ability to boot the computer from the CD-ROM drive can become an administrator by using
a LiveCD. Many types of LiveCDs exist, including the popular Ubuntu operating system series.
Ubuntu can be downloaded from http://www.ubuntu.com.
302. See G4, Dark Deal: Windows Password Hacking, http://www.g4tv.com/screensavers/
features/664/Dark_Deal_Windows_Password_Hacking.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
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decrypted to reveal the administrator’s passwords.303 After an administrator’s
password has been compromised, the potential for lost data is almost limitless.
A skilled hacker can use the credentials to remotely access client files, delete
information, send e-mails and other information on behalf of the attorney, and
execute an array of other frightening and malicious attacks.304
For all of these reasons, physical security is imperative. First, the system
BIOS305 should be configured so that a user may not boot from an external
device.306 In addition, a BIOS password should be enabled so that users cannot
make changes to this configuration.307 Next, the attorney should consider
implementing a hard drive password system, which can prevent data from
being compromised if the drive is stolen.308 Finally, the attorney should ensure
that tamper-resistant screws are installed in your computers to prevent theft of
components that might hold confidential information.
4. Hardware & Security
Firewalls are important components of any computer security system,
because they restrict the type of network traffic that can come in and out of the
network.309 Firewalls are discussed in detail in Part II.A, and vary widely in
configuration and functionality. Hardware firewalls typically offer the best
protection, but a number of software firewalls have been developed for use by
the average consumer.310
Large firms may need to hire a network professional to configure firewalls
for advanced operation. In addition, large firms can use proxy servers to
prevent employees from reaching certain websites and from conducting certain
activities on the Internet.311 Smaller firms, however, should be adequately
303. See id.
304. To make things more complicated, a hacker with such credentials can make it very
difficult to discover the origins of his attack; he can clear the server logs each time he accesses
the computer remotely.
305. The BIOS of a computer controls the computer’s hardware at a lower level than the
operating system. This means that, despite any access restrictions in the operating system, a
person with access to an unsecured BIOS can configure the computer to access external devices
before attempting to access the operating system. This can result in a breach of security, since
any security configured within the operating system will never have the opportunity to be
initialized.
306. BIOS configuration is slightly different for each model of computer; consult your
motherboard or computer manufacturer’s documentation for specific details.
307. See generally Calloway, supra note 24.
308. One vendor of a hard drive password solution is Magiclab. See StorageCrypt, http://
www.magic2003.net/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
309. See Calloway, supra note 24, at 1713-14.
310. See generally id.
311. For a detailed description of proxy servers, see Microsoft ISA Server: Previous
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protected with software firewalls,312 or inexpensive routers with integrated
firewalls.313 These products are generally available for less than fifty
dollars.314
When traditional security is not enough, an attorney should consider
employing biometric authentication. The three main methods by which
identity can be established are examining something you know, such as a
password, something that you possess, such as a magnetic slide card or access
token, and something you are, such as a biological trait.315 “Digital
certificates, public [keys], biometrics, and smart cards are all examples of
authentication methods that are generally considered very secure.”316
Biometrics offer an expensive, but considerable, security advantage.317 In a
system that uses biometrics,318 after information is collected from the user in
a recording process, the physiological trait will be used to authenticate the user
on the computer or network.319 Examples of biometrics include “passive”
measures, like the user’s “face, voice, gait, and . . . eye [measurements],” and
“active” biometrics such as “finger, hand, and vein biometrics . . . .”320
Biometrics are inherently more secure than password-based security structures
because passwords always have the potential to be guessed, and biometrics are
very difficult to falsify.
Biometric security can also be justified in terms of return on investment
(ROI). In Biometrics for Network Security, Paul Reid examines the ROI that
can be expected from various means of biometric security implementation.
Finger biometrics earn an ROI rating of 7 out of 10 because of the minimal
cost of the finger reading hardware and “the ease of deployment and
training . . . .”321 Face recognition earns a much lower 5.5 ROI rating, because
it requires high-definition cameras and presents significant deployment
costs.322 Voice biometrics also earn a ROI rating of 5.5 because the
microphone equipment is susceptible to interference that reduces its practical
Versions, http://www.microsoft.com/isaserver/prodinfo/previousversions/default.mspx (last
visited Jan. 5, 2008).
312. See Calloway, supra note 24, at 1713-14.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. REID, supra note 265, at 10-14.
316. KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 42.
317. See id. at 42-43, 435.
318. Biometrics are “physical or psychological trait[s] that can be measured, recorded, and
quantified.” REID, supra note 265, at 5.
319. Id. at 6.
320. Id. at 36.
321. Id. at 127.
322. Id. at 130.
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reliability.323 Iris biometrics, or, “scanning” the eye, scored a lower ROI rating
of 4.5, because the cost of implementing eye-scanning hardware is relatively
high, and special lights are required for proper ocular illumination.324 Thus,
the fingerprint biometric option is the “closest overall to being ideal . . . .”325
A USB Microsoft fingerprint reader is available for around forty dollars.326
5. Software Security
a) Employees & Group Policy
While a hacker can attempt to gain access to confidential information
through specific network vulnerabilities, the greater danger may be from
within the firm’s own walls. “[S]imply having a security system isn’t
enough . . . .” to protect an attorney from liability.327 Rather, an employee
security policy must be enforced.328
Employers in other industries have expressed concern of attacks by their
employees. For example, one-third of respondents to a study by Disciplined
Security were concerned about attacks from their own employees.329 This falls
just below the number of employers who feared attack by outsiders.330 In
addition, employee good faith was not necessarily the determining factor. It
was not that employers mistrusted their employees as much as they were
concerned that the employees “might import infected codes . . . and introduce
them to the company network.”331 As further evidence of this fact, a report
published in 2004 found that small businesses (from one to forty-nine
employees) experienced 53% of their network threats from internal sources.332
Thus, dangerous employees need not act maliciously. Instead, they can be
dangerous if disgruntled, careless, or angry.333 Because employees can
become an ethical hazard, employee password and resource access should be
allocated sparingly.334 Specific security permissions should be the exception,

323. Id. at 133.
324. Id. at 136.
325. Id. at 138.
326. For inexpensive fingerprint readers, see PriceScan.com, Microsoft Fingerprint Reader
USB, http://www.pricescan.com/items/item161599.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
327. See Krause, supra note 25, at 31.
328. Id.
329. PAQUET & SAXE, supra note 51, at 6.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 12.
333. Id. at 11.
334. See id.
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not the rule.335 An attorney should at least ensure though Windows group
policies and NTFS336 file security that any employee accounts are limited in
scope, and cannot modify, install, or remove files that are not in accordance
with the employee’s job duties.337 Employee accounts should require strong
passwords, and the employee should be required to change his or her password
at specific intervals.338 Employee accounts should not have sufficient
permissions to install software, and the attorney should remain vigilant to the
presence of any third-party file sharing software, which could automatically
index and share the law firm’s files with millions of clients on the Internet.339
Because employees already have a computer that is considered internal to
the network, it is easier for the user to exploit his or her limited network access
and acquire access to protected information.340 Likewise, users may establish
other connections to the Internet, such as installing a modem or remote
connection software, that will render the network much less secure.341
An employer can also remotely observe an employee’s session, if such
practice is allowed by local law. Remotely observing a user’s session allows
the employer to eavesdrop on the user’s activities without the user’s
knowledge. For example, the employer could stealthily watch as a user sends
an e-mail, browses the Internet, or plays games. Not only could the
information itself prevent a catastrophic situation, but the deterrent effect is
substantial. An employee who knows his activities may be watched and
recorded will probably be less likely to engage in unethical or otherwise
undesirable behavior.
b) Microsoft Windows Updates
The vast majority of law firms use Microsoft operating systems on their
office computers.342 At 75.2% of the install base, Windows XP is the most
commonly used operating system, followed by Windows 2000 at 12.2%.343
Less than 3% of attorneys use alternative operating systems, such as Mac OS
335. See id.
336. NTFS is an acronym for the Windows NT File System, under which attorneys can
define which users have the right to edit, delete, or read files.
337. See id.; see also Calloway, supra note 24.
338. See supra Part V.D.1.
339. Krause, supra note 25, at 31; see also Calloway, supra note 24.
340. See generally KLEVINSKY ET AL., supra note 50, at 5-50.
341. This is intuitive; if a firewall is installed at the “door” to the Internet, by installing a
modem or remote connection software on an individual machine in the network, an alternate
entrance to the network is available, essentially leaving a back door into the network which may
be exploited. Id. at 72.
342. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 26, at 39.
343. Id.
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or Linux.344 Thus, it is vital for an attorney to download and install the
security patches that Microsoft releases to correct problems detected in their
software.
Microsoft updates are available at no charge through Microsoft’s updating
service on their website.345 Updates require little effort to install and
configure, and most of them configure themselves.346 Further, after automatic
updates have been configured, the computer will retrieve and install the
updates automatically, which saves the firm time and money.347 Thus,
Microsoft updates are perhaps the least burdensome and the most helpful tool
to prevent hackers from gaining access to confidential files, and failure to
install the updates is inexcusable.
c) Antivirus and Anti-Spyware Software
Although many people may understand that viruses can infect computers,
attorneys might be surprised at the degree in which law offices fall victim to
viral attacks. In a 2005 report, the ABA revealed that 70.9% of attorneys
reported their firms were the victims of a viral attack.348 The rates of infection
were relatively proportional to firm size, with solo practitioners reporting an
infection rate of 50%, and firms of 100 or more attorneys reporting infections
at 81.6%.349 And all sixteen responding attorneys from firms between fifty and
ninety-nine attorneys reported a viral attack at their firms.350
The rates of damage reflected in the survey were also substantial. Over
35% of attorneys reported some significant damage or business loss.351 While
8.8% of the attorneys reported destroyed or lost files, more substantial
damages occurred in a small minority of attorneys.352 Specifically, 0.5% of
responding attorneys reported “[u]nauthorized access to sensitive client
data.”353 Thus, to protect client files and client confidentiality, an attorney
must attempt to prevent viral infection. A number of companies market
inexpensive antivirus software, and some programs, such as AVG Antivirus,
offer consumer licenses at no cost.354
344. Id.
345. For a detailed discussion of Microsoft Windows Updates, see Microsoft Windows
Update, http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 30, at 40.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. For AVG licensing requirements and terms of use, see AVG Anti-Virus and Internet
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6. Wireless Networking
George Riemer, General Counsel and Deputy Director of the Oregon State
Bar, defined a series of steps that should be performed to increase expectation
of privacy in an attorney’s wireless network.355 Riemer suggests that attorneys
begin by asking themselves if they actually need a wireless network, especially
if a wired network is already in place.356 Quite possibly, the small amount of
utility offered by a wireless access point pales in comparison to the substantial
increase in risk inherent in wireless networks. Further, Riemer states that
attorneys should modify the default factory settings on their wireless access
point, which prevents unauthorized persons from changing settings in the
router using the default credentials.357 This is absolutely fundamental and
should be performed in any wireless network installation and configuration.
By failing to change the default information, not only can attorneys allow a
third party to remotely connect to and administer the wireless access point, but
the third party can actually exclude the valid users. Third, Riemer advises that
wireless encryption security should be enabled; he suggests enabling 128-bit
WEP358 encryption, which seemed to be a valid choice in 2004 when the article
was written. Now, however, a far more secure method of encryption, such as
WPA, should be used.359 Finally, Riemer suggests MAC address filtering,
which, in theory, will prevent unauthorized wireless adapters from associating
with your wireless access point, thereby rendering them unable to
communicate with your network.360

Security, http://www.grisoft.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
355. George A. Riemer, The Invisible Door: Confidentiality Meets Wireless Technology, OR.
ST. B. BULL., July 2004, at 23, 24.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. WEP is an acronym for “Wired Equivalent Privacy.” It is a feature that can be used to
encrypt information on a wireless network. See Jeffrey Dingle, How Secure Is Your Wireless
Security?, SECURITY, Jan. 2007, at 34, 35.
359. See Sylvia Walsh-Flaherty, Wireless Networking Making a Big Impact, ELECS. WKLY.,
June 13, 2007, at 26, 27. WPA is an acronym for “Wi-fi Protected Access.” Id. WPA is still
vulnerable to hacking attempts if a weak password is used. In order to facilitate more robust
security, a long password with letters, numbers, and special characters should be used. See
supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
360. MAC filters are a great level of initial defense. However, hackers can use a simple tool
to scan the wireless traffic and determine which valid clients are communicating with an access
point. After a valid client is discovered, the hacker can clone the MAC address of the client,
thereby gaining access to the network. For this reason, MAC filtering in and of itself is an
insufficient form of network security. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Further, at least one state has proposed a regulatory solution for wireless
security problems. In a surprising development, California “has become the
first legislative body in the world to pass legislation requiring wireless
equipment manufacturers to warn consumers about the dangers of using
unsecured wireless connections.”361 Finding that as many as two-thirds of
wireless networks in the City of Los Angeles are not secure, the law will
require manufacturers of wireless devices to include, potentially with stickers
on the product boxes or setup software, warnings of the risks associated with
an unsecured wireless network.362
As a best practice, wireless internet security will include some form of
HTTP363 authentication that requires a user already associated with the access
point to enter a username and password to browse the Internet. Nevertheless,
the wireless network may still be vulnerable to attack.364 HTTP is relatively
effective at validating usernames and passwords, but the information is sent in
relatively easily decodable format.365 For example, a hacker may use software
to conduct an HTTP authentication attack that attempts to guess the password
through a list of probable matches or through brute force.366 Because password
guessing is somewhat inefficient, the most appropriate countermeasure for
bypassing HTTP authentication is a strong password policy.367
In any scenario, a strong wireless password should be used with a variant
of WPA security, because WEP security is easily defeated.368 In addition,
MAC address filtering should be enabled, which limits the computers that are
authorized to associate with the access point.369 Access restriction can be
further reduced in the access point firmware, such as limiting the hours in
which clients may associate wirelessly with the network, and wireless
networks can be rendered relatively secure.370 Nevertheless, attorneys should

361. Wifi Security to Become Law in California, WIRELESS AM. DAILY BULL., Sept. 4, 2006,
available at Westlaw, 2006 WLNR 15316395.
362. Id.
363. HTTP is an acronym for HyperText Transfer Protocol, and is used in web-based
authentication forms. See YOUNG & AITEL, supra note 10, at 463.
364. See generally Riemer, supra note 355.
365. YOUNG & AITEL, supra note 10, at 463-502.
366. Common programs used to bypass HTTP-based authentication include Hydra, TeeNet,
and Brutus. Each of these programs use either brute force, dictionary attacks, or a combination
thereof to attempt to guess an Internet-based method of authentication. They are also free and
readily available on the Internet. See STUART MCCLURE ET AL., HACKING EXPOSED 216-17 (5th
ed. 2005).
367. JOEL SCAMBRAY ET AL., HACKING EXPOSED WEB APPLICATIONS 129 (2d ed. 2006).
368. See supra Part II for a discussion of wireless networks.
369. SCAMBRAY ET AL., supra note 367.
370. Id.; Riemer, supra note 355, at 24; see also supra Part II.
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ensure that they truly need a wireless network before configuring a wireless
access point and weakening network security.371
7. Metadata & File Deletion
Sometimes an attorney may need to permanently delete confidential data.
Nevertheless, permanently deleting information is not easy. If an attorney
desires to delete a file permanently, merely pressing the delete key will not
perform the task.372 The problem lies with the way in which files are stored on
a hard drive.373 Because the drive uses magnetic storage, information is
contained on metal platters much like the way data is stored on the ribbon on
a cassette tape.374 The computer tracks where the files are stored on the hard
drive, much like an index.375 When the user orders the operating system to
“delete” the file, a command is executed that removes the address of the file
in this index.376 Although the computer “forgets” where the file is stored on
the drive, the file itself is still magnetically present.377 Until additional data is
written over the old data, the old data may still be recovered by using widely
available and relatively inexpensive software.378
Clearly, this could pose substantial problems to client confidentiality in the
event of the theft, sale, or other disposition of older computer hardware. If the
attorney has failed to take the appropriate steps to remove the data
magnetically stored on the drive, it could be recovered and disclosed to third
parties. This could result in identity theft and a breach of confidentiality.
In order to permanently delete information from a drive, several
applications are available. Utilities are sometimes provided by the hard drive
manufacturer that can perform an unconditional format of the drive.379
Further, “[d]ata erasing programs can be bought for $50 . . . .”380 Some
analysts have taken a harder line to data stored on hard drives, claiming, “The
only way to completely erase a hard drive is to take it out of the computer and
371. Riemer, supra note 355, at 24.
372. Krause, supra note 25, at 31-35.
373. Id.
374. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 539
(2005).
375. The old method of tracking files is by the File Allocation Table (FAT). Modern
techniques have evolved, but these techniques still track file location and other data. David F.
Rxelrod et al., Hard Times with Hard Drives: Paperless Evidence Issues That Can’t Be Papered
Over, CHAMPION, Aug. 2001, at 18, 20.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See Krause, supra note 25, at 31.
380. Id.
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smash it with a hammer . . . .”381 While this dramatic step is overkill, it
punctuates the importance of correctly destroying electronic files.
An attorney who sends an electronic word processing file may also be in
danger of inadvertently relaying confidential information to the receiving party
through metadata. “The risk of inadvertently transmitting what a lawyer
knows is confidential information to an opposing or third party has always
existed. Not too long ago, the primary risk was that a letter intended for a
client would instead be mailed or faxed to opposing counsel.”382 The danger
now is data that is hidden within electronic copies of documents that can be
“mined,” potentially exposing confidential client information.383
Metadata can yield relatively little or extraordinarily harmful information.384
For example, a file may contain only the date of creation and the name of the
author.385 Likewise, the file may contain such vital and damaging information
as “the names of everyone who has worked on or seen a specific document,
text and comments that have been deleted and different drafts of the
document.”386 However, metadata can be minimized or eliminated. Microsoft
has released a tool that is designed to remove metadata from Microsoft Word
documents.387 In addition, metadata can be minimized by saving the file in
RTF, PDF, JPG, or similar format.388

381. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This author does not recommend the hammersmash method; the physical structure of the drive could be destroyed, only to have the internal
platters re-mounted in a different drive frame. This would allow a third party to read the data
on the drive. As an extreme example of the abuses a hard drive can withstand, PCPro, a British
online news magazine, recently conducted an experiment where a hard drive was thrown across
an office several times, slammed onto a desk, and submerged in a pot of sugary, boiling hot tea
for five minutes. By transferring the platters from this hard drive into another hard drive frame,
OnTrack, a commercial data recovery company, was able to recover all of the files from the
damaged hard drive. See What Does It Take To Destroy a Hard Disk?, PCPRO, May 16, 2007,
http://www. pcpro.co.uk/features/113080/what-does-it-take-to-destroy-a-hard-disk.html.
382. David Hricik, I Can Tell When You’re Telling Lies: Ethics and Imbedded Confidential
Information, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 79, 79 (2006).
383. See supra Part II.A.
384. See supra Part II.A.
385. See supra Part II.A.
386. Jason Krause, Hidden Agendas: Unlocking Invisible Electronic Codes Can Reveal
Deleted Text, Revisions, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 26, 26; see also supra Part II.A.
387. The metadata removal tool can be found by searching Microsoft’s website. See
Microsoft Corporation, http://www.microsoft.com (search for “rhdtool.exe”) (last visited Jan.
5, 2008).
388. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 442 (2006).
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8. E-mail
States differ widely as to which standard should be applied to e-mail. Most
states allow attorneys to transmit confidential data in unencrypted e-mail
absent special circumstances. Some require written consent of the client
before the client’s information is electronically transferred, while others
mandate prudence and caution.389 The various interpretations of what security
measures are required in terms of e-mail are helpful in determining what steps
should be taken to reasonably secure one’s network, but not determinative.
As a general rule, the attorney should take care that the recipient of a
confidential e-mail has a secure receiving location.390 Other parties should not
have ready access to the recipient’s e-mail. In addition, it may be worth the
slight configuration burden to enable some light form of encryption.391 Even
light encryption would make intercepting and reading e-mail more difficult.392
Finally, if an attorney sends a document through e-mail, he or she should take
the extra time required to password-protect attached files, which is a service
available in all modern word processing systems.393
Thus, while the attorney must take what seem to be many steps to ensure
network security, the steps are small and the road is relatively smooth. By
following the guidelines in Part IV, attorneys can be relatively confident that
their electronic files are secure. Likewise, attorneys will have taken reasonable
steps to secure the confidentiality of client files, and will have satisfied their
rules of ethics.
VI. Conclusion
Attorneys’ fundamental duties to clients have not been altered by the advent
of computer technology. Nevertheless, the rules of ethics must adapt to the
389. See State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04
(1997), available at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=480 (noting lawyers
should use e-mail cautiously, consider encryption, and include a cautionary statement that
information is confidential); S.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 97-08 (1997),
available at http://scbar.org/member/opinion.asp?opinionID=469 (holding lawyers may
communicate with clients via e-mail but should discuss encryption options). But see Iowa Sup.
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics and Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997), available at http://www.iowabar.
org/ethics.nsf/ (follow “Iowa Board of Professional Ethics Opinions” hyperlink; then follow
“09/18/1997 97-01” hyperlink) (stating client must give written consent to transmission of
information by e-mail or Internet, and only after disclosure of potential for loss of
confidentiality).
390. See supra Part III.C.
391. See State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04.
392. Id.
393. See Calloway & Murdock, supra note 211, at 2601.
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new realities of the law office. Because the standard of maintaining client
confidentiality is based upon reasonableness, an attorney has a duty that has
expanded to envelop a wide range of technology that, perhaps a decade ago,
would have never been contemplated. The duties owed by attorneys to clients
are substantial, and the risks of breaching these duties are real. To take no
action to prevent hacking and protect electronic files is to virtually ensure
ethical responsibility. Thus, a reasonable amount of security must be
configured on each computer network that contains confidential information
and is exposed to the public through either an Internet connection or a wireless
network configuration. By taking these steps, attorneys can evade liability for
the disclosure of client information that has been electronically stolen. As
more attorneys begin to use networking equipment, more firms and clients will
be exposed to attack. It is expected that, as case law develops, courts will hold
that attorneys who follow the recommendations, strategies, and reasonableness
analysis in this comment will have satisfied their ethical standards.
Nevertheless, until more cases are heard, attorneys must continue to
speculate on precisely which conduct is acceptable, and which is not. As is
often the case in life, with respect to the question of computer ethics, perhaps
practical wisdom is best:
Technology malpractice suits are rare, and they can be kept that
way if lawyers don’t make dumb mistakes that, offend or upset
their clients. Keep the clients happy and always let them make
decisions about how you’ll use technology to represent them . . . .
Happy, informed clients don’t sue their attorneys.394
Ash Mayfield

394. Krause, supra note 25, at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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